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Abstract: 
 
  Waste management is a prevalent and highly contentious issue in modern society. 
People are often very sensitive about decisions on where and how municipalities choose 
to dispose of their waste. While it is generally understood that waste disposal facilities 
such as incinerators and landfills are needed to manage waste that cannot be recycled or 
composted, there nevertheless seems to be significant opposition in response to any such 
proposal. This paper will be exploring how communities are currently being engaged in 
Ontario during the development approval process for incinerators, what motivates 
communities to actively oppose incinerators, and what can be done to mitigate this 
opposition. To do this I will be making a case study out of the development approval 
process for the Durham York Energy Centre (DYEC). The DYEC is a waste-to-energy 
incinerator in Clarington, Ontario that began operations in 2015. This facility received a 
significant amount of opposition from the community, which will be explored in detail in 
this paper. While I focus on incinerator development my goal was to learn the best 
methods for engaging communities for any undesirable development including landfills 
and nuclear power plants. 
 
 My research findings suggest that incinerator opposition cannot be mitigated 
through basic consultation. No amount of consultation will convince people to approve of 
something they do not want, especially when they feel that it is being forced on them. 
The goal of community communications plans should not be mitigating opposition but 
rather should be engaging communities to find optimal strategies for handling communal 
problems such as waste management or energy.   
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This paper will also be looking at alternative waste disposal options for municipal 
solid waste that cannot be recycled or composted. Having an understanding of the 
alternatives will allow for a more educated discussion on how municipalities can best 
manage their waste.  
 
Foreword:  	  
This major paper is being submitted to partially fulfill the MES Planning degree 
requirements. The research involved in the composition of this major paper relates to my 
area of concentration, components, and fulfills a number of learning objectives outlined 
in my Plan of Study. For component 1, waste management planning, this research 
contributed to my goal of meeting the program requirements of the Canadian Institute of 
Planners and Ontario Professional Planners Institute for Candidate membership (Learning 
Objective 1.1). It allowed me to enhance my understanding of Canada’s waste 
management practices and policies (Learning Objective 1.2). It also enhanced my 
understanding of regional infrastructure planning (Learning Objective 1.3).  For 
component 2, community engagement, this research enhanced my understanding of 
Ontario’s community engagement policies and practices (Learning Objective 2.1). It also 
explored popular community engagement theories (Learning Objective 2.2). For 
component 3, social and environmental justice, this research explored Ontario’s risk 
environmental assessment policies and practices (Learning Objective 3.1). It explored the 
environmental impact waste disposal facilities have on human and environmental health 
as well as mitigation strategies (Learning Objective 3.2). It also explored the health 
impacts towards communities living near waste disposal sites (Learning Objective 3.3).  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: 
 Waste management is a prevalent and highly contentious issue in modern society. 
People are often very sensitive about decisions on where and how municipalities choose 
to dispose of their waste. While it is generally understood that waste disposal facilities 
such as incinerators and landfills are needed to manage waste that cannot be recycled or 
composted, there nevertheless seems to be significant opposition in response to any such 
proposal. Significant opposition such as this was seen during the development approval 
process for the Durham York Energy Centre (DYEC). The DYEC is a waste-to-energy 
incinerator in Clarington, Ontario. It began operating in 2015 and processes 140,000 
tonnes of Durham and York Region’s municipal solid waste (MSW) per year (Durham 
Region 2010). The facility produces a net output of 14 MW-hr, which is approximately 
enough energy to power 10,000 homes (Durham Region 2010). The proponent felt that 
building this incinerator was the most logical option to manage the Region’s waste. It 
minimized the Region’s need for landfill capacity and it allowed waste, which would 
otherwise have simply been buried underground, to instead be used as an energy source. 
Despite this enthusiasm for the technology, thousands of people came out to voice 
opposition to it over the course of the development approval process. They voiced 
concerns about the impact the incinerator would have on environmental and human 
health, economic concerns, and concerns that an incinerator would compete with 
recycling initiatives.  
 
Objectives	  and	  Organization	  of	  the	  Paper:	  
 The question I wanted to research was, what was driving opposition to incinerator 
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development and what could be done to mitigate the opposition? While I focus on 
incinerator development my goal was to learn the best methods for engaging 
communities for any undesirable development including landfills and nuclear power 
plants. To answer this question I first needed to understand how communities are 
currently being engaged when a contentious facility is being proposed. I analyzed the 
practices used during the development of the DYEC for my case study because it is the 
first and only large-scale municipal solid waste incinerator built in Ontario since 1992 
(Carter-Whitney 2007). I then explored the various options for disposing municipal solid 
waste in order to have a more educated understanding of the incinerator debate. Once I 
had a deeper understanding of the waste disposal alternatives I looked at the opposition to 
the DYEC. I explored the arguments and methods used by the opposition as well as the 
response they received from the proponents of the project. I did not focus on the accuracy 
of their arguments but rather tried to develop an understanding of what they believed and 
how they felt their concerns were being addressed. I followed this up by researching 
theory that tries to explain what motivates people to oppose incinerators. I validated this 
theory with examples from the DYEC opposition movement. I looked at community 
engagement theories to develop an understanding of the thought behind the community 
engagement practices of the DYEC and whether or not they addressed the motivations 
behind incinerator opposition.  Finally I use the theory to find a possible solution to the 
problems of modern community engagement practices.   
 
Limitations:	  
 The findings of this research are limited because the paper only focuses on one 
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case. While it is a noteworthy case that adds to the broader discussion of public 
involvement experience, it is not definitive. One cannot make generalizations about all 
community engagement practices from the study of a single case.  
 
Research	  Design	  and	  Methodology:	  
I used a “Case Study Design” for my research, using the development approval 
process for the DYEC as my case study. This research design allowed me to get a strong 
understanding of how communities are currently being engaged leading up to the 
development of municipal solid waste incinerators. For my methodology, I started by 
reading the various public documents and publications related to the DYEC such as the 
environmental assessment, health risk assessments, regional and municipal council 
meeting minutes, advisory committee minutes, complaint logs, and media releases. This 
gave me an understanding of the project as a whole and the justifications for its 
development made by the proponent. I used newspaper articles and blog posts from 
community groups to learn about the public’s reactions and opinions to the DYEC. I then 
read academic journals and books relating to the topics of incinerator development, 
NIMBYism, community engagement, site planning, and waste management in order to 
gather a strong understanding of the academic thought surround my topic.  
Academic	  Context:	  
 As mentioned above, the DYEC is the first large-scale municipal solid waste 
incinerator to be built in Ontario since 1992. This paper supplements gaps in existing 
academic literature by analyzing modern community engagement practices for 
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incinerator development in Ontario. This paper makes use of incinerator opposition 
theory and community engagement theories from various authors. Some of these authors 
include Armour, Petts, Lawrence, and Miraftab.     
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Chapter 2 – Developing Waste-To-Energy Incinerators in Ontario: 
 
 In this chapter I will be looking at the process for developing waste-to-energy 
incinerators in Ontario. I start by looking at the regulations and policies that govern the 
development of new incinerators in Ontario. I then examine the history of incineration in 
Ontario and the DYEC in order to understand the genesis towards the decision to develop 
an incinerator. I end by looking at the environmental assessment process for the DYEC in 
order to understand the steps that were taken to turn a proposal into a completed 
incinerator.  
 
Regulations and Policies for Incineration in Ontario: 
Environmental Protection Act: 
 
 In Ontario, the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MOECC) 
administers waste management. Their waste management powers are established under 
Part V of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) (Carter-Whitney 2007). The EPA 
requires that all waste management systems and waste disposal sites in the province 
receive a certificate of approval from the MOECC before being developed. MOECC also 
has the power to impose terms and conditions on the certificate of approval as well as 
suspend or revoke them (Carter-Whitney 2007). Non-hazardous waste incinerators are 
subject to approval under sections 9 and 27 of the EPA. Section 9 requires that conditions 
for approval on discharges to the air are met. Section 27 requires that the conditions for 
approval on waste management systems or waste disposal sites are met (Carter-Whitney 
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2007). The actual environmental conditions that must be met in these two sections are 
prescribed in Reg. 346, 347, and Guideline A-7 (Carter-Whitney 2007). Reg. 346 of the 
EPA lays out the general air pollution rules for the province. The province’s general 
standards for incinerators, which include the rules surrounding their location, 
maintenance, and operation are found in Reg. 347 (Carter-Whitney 2007). Guideline A-7 
is used in addition to Reg. 346 and 347. It establishes the “minimum design and operating 
parameters, emission control systems, and emission limits” for incinerators in Ontario 
(Carter-Whitney 2007).  
 
Environmental Assessment Act: 
 
 Proposals for new incinerators are subject to the Environmental Assessment Act 
(EAA) in addition to the EPA. Municipalities must obtain approval under the EAA before 
they can go ahead with their project. This means that they cannot enter into contracts or 
make arrangements to utilize the services or facilities of third parties (Carter-Whitney 
2007). The EAA requires that an environmental assessment (EA) be prepared for all new 
waste projects (Carter-Whitney 2007). An EA must include, “a description of the purpose 
of the undertaking, the rationale of the undertaking, as well as the alternative methods of 
carrying out the undertaking” (Carter-Whitney 2007). The EA must include an analysis 
of the environmental impacts of each of the proposed options. Finally, the EA also needs 
to include an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each option (Carter-
Whitney 2007).  
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 Waste disposal processes are separated into three categories within the EAA. The 
categories dictate the level EA that each type of facility needs to complete in order to 
obtain approval (Carter-Whitney 2007). The lowest category includes projects with 
minimal environmental effects. This includes landfills that are smaller than 40,000 cubic 
metres, energy-from-waste incinerators that process less than 100 tonnes of waste per 
day, as well as waste transfer, handling, and composting facilities that process less than 
1000 tonnes of waste per day (Carter-Whitney 2007). Projects that fall under this 
category do not require approval under the EAA (Carter-Whitney 2007). The second 
category is for projects with predictable environmental effects. Projects under this 
category do require approval under the EAA and must undergo a standard class EA 
(Carter-Whitney 2007). This includes projects such as landfills that are between 40,000 
and 100,000 cubic metres, energy-from-waste incinerators that process more than 100 
tonnes of waste per day, as well as transfer, handling, and composting facilities that 
process more than 1000 tonnes of waste per day (Carter-Whitney 2007). The final 
category is for projects that have the potential to cause significant environmental impacts. 
These include hazardous waste facilities, landfills that are larger than 100,000 cubic 
metres, and incinerators that do not have an energy-from-waste component (Carter-
Whitney 2007). These types of facilities are required to undergo an individual EA, which 
tend to have significantly more stringent requirements than a class EA (Carter-Whitney 
2007). 
 
History of the Durham York Waste to Energy Centre: (See	  Appendix	  Fig	  3	  for	  chronology	  of	  key	  events	  related	  to	  the	  DYEC)	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 The province of Ontario has a long history of incinerating their municipal solid 
waste. The City of Toronto built its first garbage incinerator in 1881. By 1917 
incinerators managed 50% of the city’s waste. (Anderson 1997) Incinerator use continued 
in Toronto to varying degrees until 1988 when Toronto ceased its use of incinerators due 
to environmental and public health concerns. (Eyles, Boyce, Hibbert 1992) The rest of 
the province continued to use and develop incinerators to dispose of their municipal solid 
waste until 1992, when a ban on new incinerators put forward by the Ontario Ministry of 
the Environment, then under the New Democratic Party (NDP), came into effect (Carter-
Whitney 2007). The NDP were concerned that developing new incinerators ran counter 
to their position of waste reduction. They felt that their proposed waste reduction efforts 
would reduce the province’s waste output to the point where there would not be enough 
waste left to fuel any additional incinerators (Carter-Whitney 2007). New incinerators 
would only be viable if they did not fully commit to their waste reduction program. The 
ban on new incinerators was lifted in 1995 when the Progressive Conservative party took 
power (Carter-Whitney 2007).  
 
 In December 1999 the Region of Durham released their “Long Term Waste 
Management Strategy Plan: 2000 - 2020”. The goal of this plan was to develop a 20-year 
waste reduction and disposal strategy for the region. (Region of Durham Works 
Department Waste Management Services 1999) At the time this document had been 
published, Durham Region had a need to secure an alternative waste disposal site because 
the one that they had been using for 64% of their waste, the Keele Valley Landfill, was 
set to close in the fall of 2002. (Region of Durham Works Department Waste 
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Management Services 1999) The waste disposal strategy laid out in this plan was: 
 
1) “Continue to Participate with the other Greater Toronto Area Regions to Search for 
waste disposal capacity.” 
2) “Search for waste disposal capacity outside the Region in preparation for the 
closure of the Keele Valley Landfill site in the year 2002.” 
3) “Not support the development of any new landfill site or landfill site operation 
within the Region of Durham” 
4) “Support the development of “Energy From Waste” type facilities to generate 
steam and/ or electricity from the disposal of residual garbage wastes.” 
5) “Support the development of proven new and emerging waste disposal facilities 
for the disposal of residual garbage wastes.” (Region of Durham Works 
Department Waste Management Services 1999) 
 
 This plan was the first step toward the region’s eventual development of the 
Durham York Energy Centre. They had a two-pronged strategy. First, Durham would 
seek to dispose of their garbage outside of region. Second, they would support the 
development of a waste disposal facility within the region so long as it was not landfill. 
They had specifically stated in strategy 4 (above) that they would support the 
development of an “energy from waste” type facility.  
 
 In keeping with their waste management strategy, Durham Region began seeking 
out waste disposal capacity outside of the region. In 2003 Durham Region, in addition to 
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various other municipalities in Ontario, began to ship their solid waste across the border 
to the State of Michigan. Since that time Ontario has shipped anywhere between 1.5 to 
4.5 million tons of trash per year to Michigan (WMW 2011). Michigan residents were not 
happy to be taking in Canadian garbage and raised various concerns including: 
“environmental contamination from the landfills; traffic congestion; damaged roads from 
truck traffic; and border security issues” (Carter-Whitney 2007). In 2006, this opposition 
finally bore fruit when U.S. Senators Debbie Stabenow and Carl Levin negotiated an 
agreement with the Ontario’s Minister of the Environment that ensured that Ontario 
municipalities would cease their shipments of municipal solid waste to landfills in the 
State of Michigan by the end of 2010 (WMW 2011). In exchange for their cooperation in 
ceasing garbage shipments, the agreement assured Canadian municipalities that the state 
of Michigan would not put forward any legislature or legislative amendments that would 
prevent the shipment of waste from Ontario to Michigan between 2006 and 2010 (Carter-
Whitney 2007). 
 
 In 2004 Durham Region began the “Durham Residual Waste Disposal Study EA”. 
The purpose of this study was to determine the most effective way for the region to 
locally manage their non-hazardous solid waste that could not be disposed of either 
through recycling or composting. (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010) This 
name of this study was later changed to the “Durham/ York Residual Waste Study” in 
May 2005, when York Region partnered with Durham Region in the development of this 
project.  
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The Environmental Assessment Process for the DYEC: 
Choosing a Waste Management Solution: 
 Durham and York hired ‘MacViro Consultants Inc.’ and ‘Jaques Whitford’, two 
engineering and environmental science consulting firms, to identify and evaluate 
different ways of managing post diversion waste (MacViro 2006).  
Alternative Waste Management Options and Evaluation:  
 The consultants were tasked with finding the optimal way to recover resources, 
both material and energy, and to minimize the amount of material requiring landfill 
disposal for the residual municipal solid waste for Durham and York Regions (MacViro 
2006). To this end they set out to find the optimal technologies to manage the region’s 
residual waste.  
 
The following are the technologies considered by the consultants: 
- Additional Diversion at Source 
- Mechanical Treatment 
o Mechanical treatment to create an Alternative Fuel 
o Mechanical treatment for material recovery 
o Steam treatment for material recovery 
- Biological Treatment 
o Aerobic compositing 
o Anaerobic digestion 
- Thermal Treatment 
o Advanced Thermal Technologies 
§  Fixed-bed gasification 
§ Fluidized-bed gasification 
§ High temperature gasification 
§ Plasma arc gasification 
§ Pyrolysis 
o Conventional Combustion Treatment 
§ Single Stage Mass Burn 
§ Two Stage Incineration 
- Chemical / Other Treatment 
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o Chemical Treatment 
o Treatment requiring special feedstock 
- Landfilling of Residuals (MacViro 2005) 
 
 The consultants reviewed each of the above-mentioned technologies in order to see 
which ones best met the requirements laid out in the EA Terms of Reference. They 
concluded that waste reduction and at-source diversion of MSW are the most preferred 
components of an integrated waste management system. The consultants recommended 
that Durham and York set waste diversion target of 60% by 2011 and 75% by 2045 
(MacViro 2006). By 2014 Durham Region had managed to achieve a diversion rate of 
55% (Region of Durham Works Department Waste Management Services 2015). In 
Comparison, York Region has achieved a diversion rate of 64% by 2014 (Committee of 
the Whole Environmental Services 2015). For the waste that could not be diverted, the 
consultants produced a short list of four optimal technologies that had the least 
environmental impact, diverted the most waste from landfill, and were economically and 
commercially viable. The four short listed systems were: 
 
System 1 - Mechanical and Biological Treatment with Biogas Recovery: 
 Mechanical and biological treatment (MBT) of waste involves removing organic 
and recyclable materials from the waste stream before sending it to a landfill for final 
disposal. Out of the 4 proposed systems, this one requires the most landfill space and thus 
poses the greatest threat to the ground and water environment but it is the least harmful to 
the air environment (see chapter 3 for more information on this technology). 
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System 2(a) - Thermal Treatment of Mixed Waste (conventional combustion) with 
Recovery of Materials from the Ash / Char  
 This system is proposing the use of a traditional mass burn system. It is the most 
cost efficient and technically proven system. It also has the least amount of reliance on 
landfill space. It does have the greatest potential harm to the air environment out of the 
presented options (see chapter 3 for more information on this technology). 
System 2(b) - Thermal Treatment of Solid Recovered Fuel: 
 System 2(b) is proposing the use of an advanced thermal treatment facility, either 
gasification or pyrolysis. This technology is relatively new and isn’t as proven as mass 
burn. It is also more costly to build and run. It does have fewer air emissions than mass 
burn and the potential to recover more recyclables (see chapter 3 for more information on 
this technology).  
System 2(c) - Thermal Treatment of Solid Recovered Fuel with Biogas Recovery 
 This system is a combination of system 1 and 2(b). Organics and recyclables are 
sorted before being sent to an incinerator. Biogas is recovered through the processing of 
the organics in addition to energy being captured from the incineration of the remaining 
waste. The ash that results from the incinerator is then sent to landfill. It is the most 
expensive and technically complex option but offers the greatest potential for the 
recovery of energy and recyclables. It is also the least harmful to the natural environment. 
  
 The alternative processing systems were evaluated using a seven-step method 
outlined in the ‘Terms of Reference’ of the EA. The steps are as follows: 
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 1) Perform public consultation to receive additional input on the proposed 
evaluation steps and evaluation criteria presented in the EA Terms of Reference.  
 2) Create a list of all the alternative waste processing systems that can manage the 
entire projected residual waste stream. 
 3) Collect data on each of the suitable alternatives. This data would be used to 
analyze how well each alternative would meet the criteria laid out in the Terms of 
Reference. Interested agencies and the public have the opportunity to give input on 
acceptable data sources in ‘Step 1’ of this process. 
 4) Use the data to analyze each alternative using the comparative evaluation criteria 
laid out in the Terms of Reference and identify the potential effects of each technology.  
 5) Determine the ‘net effects’ of each alternative by considering what measures are 
available to mitigate potential negative effects of each technology (identified in ‘Step 4’) 
and the available measures to enhance their potential benefits.  
 6) Compare the net effects of each alternative and produce a list of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages associated with each technology.  
 7) Consider the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative in the context of 
the priorities established in ‘Step 1’. The preferred system will be the one that is best able 
to meet those priorities (MacViro 2006).  
 
 On April 19, 2006 the consultants began a 30-day consultation period with the 
public and interested agencies to review their draft report and submit comments, pose 
questions, and make suggestions on potential modifications to the results. The consultants 
reported that 80% of the public who participated in the consultation process agreed with 
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their recommendation. Public agreement was verified through the use of questionnaires 
that were filled in by the attendees of the consultation. A total of 83 people completed the 
questionnaire (MacViro 2006). The ‘Joint Waste Management Group’, a sub-committee 
of the Durham Region Works Committee and the York Region Solid Waste Committee, 
hired a public polling firm, Ipsos Reid to make a survey available online to determine the 
residents’ priorities relating to a new waste management facility. The online survey 
received responses from 449 Durham residents and 423 York residents. The results found 
that respondents were most concerned with ‘natural environmental considerations’, 
followed by ‘social/ cultural considerations’, ‘economic/ financial considerations’, 
‘technical considerations’, and were least concerned with ‘legal considerations’ (MacViro 
2006).   
 
 Using the above mentioned criteria as a guide, the consultants brought forth the 
recommendation that the region’s interests would best be served through the use of 
system 2(a) - thermal treatment of mixed waste (conventional combustion) with recovery 
of materials from the ash / char (MacViro 2006). They explained that system 2(a) and 
2(b) offer similar benefits but the technology used in system 2(a) is more proven and less 
likely to have unexpected problems. System 2(a) is the most cost effective system and 
minimizes the region’s need for landfill space.  
 
 The consultants relayed this information to the public through six public 
information centres (PICs) in May 2006. The PICs gave the public an opportunity to 
provide feedback about their preferred waste disposal technology. Sixty advertisements 
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informing the public of these meetings ran from February 22 to May 8 2006 in 
community newspapers, theatres, radio, major Toronto dailies, and buses in both York 
and Durham Region (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). Around 300 residents 
attended the six sessions. Input received at these sessions determined that residents were 
in favour of the consultant’s recommendation for a thermal treatment facility (The 
Regional Municipality of Durham 2010).  Both Durham and York Regional Councils 
accepted the consultant’s recommendation in June 2006 (The Regional Municipality of 
Durham 2010).  
Choosing a Site: 
 In September 2006, Durham and York started obtaining public feedback about what 
criteria should be prioritized when selecting a site for the incinerator (The Regional 
Municipality of Durham 2010). This was done through six PICs. They found that the 
public felt that the health and safety of the public and natural environment should be the 
most important criteria followed by social considerations, economic considerations, 
technical considerations, and finally legal considerations (The Regional Municipality of 
Durham 2010). The consultants then eliminated all the sites that were unsuitable for 
environmental and legislative reasons. This included, “lands protected by provincial/ 
federal legislation; designated residential areas; natural heritage lands; prime agricultural 
lands; designated parks and recreation areas; existing and designated institutional 
facilities; federally regulated airport lands” (MacViro 2007). Out of the remaining lands 
the consultants looked for a site that was 10-12 hectares in size and allowed for on-site 
ash processing, storm water management, parking, road infrastructure, and adequate 
buffer zones (MacViro 2007). They looked at both sites that were publicly owned by 
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Durham and York Regions as well as sites from “willing sellers” (MacViro 2007).   
 
 In March 2007, the consultants brought forth a short list of 5 potential sites (The 
Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). Four of the sites were located in Durham 
Region and the other was in York. The four Durham Region sites were all located in the 
Municipality of Clarington, one of which was publicly owned (MacViro 2007). The site 
in York Region was located in the Municipality of East Gwillimbury and was also 
municipally owned (MacViro 2007). The public was given the opportunity to voice their 
opinions and concerns about this list at four PICs. Hundreds of residents came out to 
these PICs to voice their concerns about the facility’s impacts on humans, the 
environment, and technology just to name a few (The Regional Municipality of Durham 
2010).  
 
 The short listed sites were evaluated to determine the impact an incinerator would 
have using the ‘Generic Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment’ (GHHERA) 
(The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). As the specific size and technology for the 
incinerator had not been chosen yet, the GHHERA was based on the potential chemicals 
emitted from a generic energy-from-waste incinerator. Additionally, the study used 
regional air modeling data, not site-specific data. This meant that it was not able to 
determine how the facility would impact the air shed of each site. The study was designed 
to determine potential issues and concerns that would later be addressed in a site-specific 
study. The GHHERA found that an incinerator would not have significant adverse effects 
to the short listed sites (Jacques Whitford 2007). As all the sites were deemed to be 
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environmentally suitable the short listed sites were largely evaluated based on their 
proximity to necessary infrastructure and whether or not they were publicly owned. 
 
 The consultants ultimately recommended the publicly owned site located in 
Clarington. Out of the potential sites this one allowed for the shortest travel times for 
waste collection vehicles, which minimized total air pollution (Jacques Whitford 2007b). 
It had the lowest water quality impact, as it was furthest away from a watercourse 
(Jacques Whitford 2007b). It also had no wooded areas present on the site, which means 
no trees would need to be removed to develop the facility (Jacques Whitford 2007b). The 
consultants did note that the site’s proximity to the highway and other industrial facilities 
would make it a burden on an already stressed air shed. East Gwillimbury held the 
advantage in this category but the consultants felt that the Clarington location was the 
better choice overall (Jacques Whitford 2007b).  
 
 Three PICs were held to notify the public of the consultant’s recommendation. 
Approximately 380 residents attended these meetings (The Regional Municipality of 
Durham 2010). Durham and York Regional Councils accepted the recommended 
preferred site in January 2008 (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010).  
Choosing A Build/ Operator:  
 Durham and York Region put out a request for proposal (RFP) for the design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the energy-from-waste incinerator in August 
2008 (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). They received the submissions in 
February 2009. The Regions announced that they had accepted the proposal from 
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Covanta Energy Corporation in April 2009 (The Regional Municipality of Durham 
2010). They were given the contract to design the facility and a conditional contract to 
build and operate it. The condition being that the EA receives approval from Ontario’s 
MOECC (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010).  
Site Specific Studies: 
 Once the site had been selected the consultants started performing many site-
specific studies. Some examples include air quality, archaeological, and soil 
contamination studies. These studies aimed to find if there were any significant issues on 
the site (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). The studies found that there were 
no issues with building the incinerator on the site. Although it was not required in the EA, 
Durham and York Region performed a human health and ecological risk assessment to 
determine if the facility would pose a risk to human and ecological life at the preferred 
site. The report found that, “the EFW facility would not lead to any adverse health risks 
to local residents, farmers or other receptors in the Local Risk Assessment Study Area 
(LRASA)” (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). The report also found that, 
“the results of the ecological risk assessment indicated that chemical emissions from the 
EFW Facility would not lead to any adverse ecological risks to receptors or species at 
risk in LARSA” (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). 
EA Submission, Approval, Construction, and Operation: 
 Durham Region Council approved the EA in June 2009 and submitted it to the 
MOECC on July 2009 (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). The MOECC 
approved the EA in November 2010. The construction of the facility began in August 
2011 (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2010). The facility began processing waste 
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in February 2015. It is designed to process up to 140,000 tonnes of municipal solid waste 
per year and generates 17.5 gross megawatts of energy, which is enough to power 
10,000-12,000 homes (The Regional Municipality of Durham 2015). Pictures of the 
completed facility can be seen in ‘Appendix Fig 1’. 
 
 In this chapter I discussed the regulations surrounding incinerator development in 
Ontario, the history of the DYEC, and the environmental assessment process for the 
DYEC. It was a long process that began in 2004 with the residual waste study and ended 
in 2015 when the facility started its operations. In the next chapter I will be discussing the 
various options for managing residual solid waste.  
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Chapter 3 - Understanding Modern Waste Disposal Facilities:  
 In this chapter I will be discussing the most widely used waste disposal 
technologies and systems in order to get an understanding of the various options 
governments have to manage their residual waste. I will be looking at incineration (both 
mass burn and advanced thermal treatment), mechanical and biological treatment, and 
landfilling. I will explain what each one is, what they are used for, their processes, and 
their advantages and disadvantages compared to one another. I will be focusing on 
incineration, as it is the main topic of this paper.  
 
Incineration 
 Incineration is a technology that allows waste to undergo complete combustion by 
burning it at temperatures of around 900 - 1100 degrees Celsius (Ramachandra 2006). 
The complete combustion of solid wastes eliminates odours, produces a virtually inert 
residue, and reduces the weight and volume of the product going to landfill by up to 90%. 
(Ramachandra 2006) In this section I 
will be discussing the benefits of 
using incineration for solid waste 
management, the negatives, the 
different kinds of incineration 
technologies, as well as planning 
considerations when developing new 
municipal solid waste incinerators.  
Durham	  York	  Energy	  Centre.	  Digital	  Image.	  PLANT.	  Accessed	  
September	  2016.	  http://www.plant.ca/features/cleaner-­‐burn/ 	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Benefits of Incineration 
Volume Reduction: 
 Incineration reduces the volume of MSW by an average of 90% and the weight by 
70-75% (Ramachandra 2006). Reducing the volume and weight of the MSW minimizes a 
municipality’s need for landfill space, which has both a cost saving and environmental 
benefit. Additionally the environmental impact and costs of transporting the MSW are 
reduced as a result of fewer trucks being needed to move the ash, as opposed to the 
untreated MSW.   
 
Stabilization of Waste: 
 Many of the environmental impacts caused by landfilling such as air emissions and 
the production of leachate, which pollutes groundwater, result from the decomposing of 
the organic compounds in the waste stream (Ramachandra 2006). Incinerating MSW 
before sending it to landfill as ash reduces these issues because ash is significantly more 
inert than untreated waste (Ramachandra 2006). This is mainly due to the “oxidation of 
the organic components in the waste stream” (Ramachandra 2006).      
  
Recovery of Energy from Waste: 
 The heat generated from burning the MSW is used to generate steam, which is used 
for on-site electricity generation. It can also be exported to local factories or used for 
district heating (Ramachandra 2006).  
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Sterilization of Waste: 
 The incineration of MSW ensures the destruction of all the pathogens in the waste 
stream prior to its final disposal in a landfill (Ramachandra 2006). 
Environmental Impact of Incineration 
Air pollution: 
 Incineration results in the formation of flue gas, which is comprised of the 
following gaseous pollutants.  
  - Carbon Dioxide 
  - Carbon Monoxide 
  - Sulphur Oxides 
  - Nitrogen Oxides  
  - Particulates 
  - Hydrochloric Acid 
  - Hydrogen Fluoride 
  - Heavy Metals 
  - Dioxins and Furans (Ramachandra 2006) 
 
 There are three primary technologies that are used to clean the flue gas. These are 
electrostatic precipitators, fabric filters and scrubbers. Electrostatic precipitators (ESP) 
are used for particle control. The gas is filtered through an ionized field, which negatively 
charges the particles (Ramachandra 2006). The negatively charged particles are then 
forced to the walls using an electric field (Ramachandra 2006). The particles, which are 
trapped against the wall, are then washed away using a continuous stream of water 
(Ramachandra 2006). This technology has 99% removal efficiency in an optimal 
environment. Efficiency decreases with changes to the size of the particles, the 
temperature of the gas stream, gas stream composition, particle composition, and particle 
surface characteristics (Ramachandra 2006).  
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 Fabric Filters are the most common technology used for controlling particulate 
matter (Ramachandra 2006). The gas is directed to flow through a number of bags that 
catch dust and particulate. The material collected on the bags works to help increase the 
efficiency of the system at filtering small particles (Ramachandra 2006). Incinerators that 
use this technology must cool the gas before sending it to the filters to prevent damaging 
the fabric (Ramachandra 2006). 
 Scrubbers are used to control both particulate matter and acid gases. The flue gas is 
directed to pass through a vat that contains a slurry of chemicals that have been designed 
to absorb specific compounds (Ramachandra 2006). When acid gases are absorbed they 
react to form solid salts. The heat from the flue gas causes the liquid in the slurry, with 
the absorbed particulate and salts, to evaporate and eventually precipitate to the bottom of 
the unit where it is collected and disposed of (Ramachandra 2006). This system can 




 Incineration facilities produce a significant amount of wastewater. The water used 
to wash the tipping floors that feed the MSW into the incinerator, water that is used to 
quench the hot ash, and water that is used in pollution control systems all become 
polluted (Ramachandra 2006). Most incineration facilities recycle their wastewater in a 
closed loop system (Ramachandra 2006). Wastewater is collected and stored in a tank and 
then reused for ash quenching (Ramachandra 2006). 
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Land Retained Pollution: 
 Pollutants emitted from the incinerator stack bio-accumulate into the environment 
over the course of the plant’s lifetime (Ramachandra 2006). Despite being released in 
minuscule amounts that are non-harmful, the pollutants will eventually be ingested by 
plants, animals, and humans (Ramachandra 2006). The introduction of these pollutants to 
the food chain may eventually have negative effects as they accumulate over time. These 
effects are very difficult to monitor as they slowly build over many years in conjunction 
with pollutants from other sources (Ramachandra 2006).  
 
Residue Disposal: 
 Certain metals within the waste stream if improperly handled can negatively impact 
human and environmental health. Particularly lead, cadmium and mercury  
(Ramachandra 2006). Special care bust be taken to remove these metals from the waste 
prior to combustion and ensure that they are properly disposed of (Ramachandra 2006).   
 
Noise Pollution: 
 The two primary sources of incinerator noise pollution come from truck traffic and 
the emission control fans within the plant (Ramachandra 2006). Noise from the trucks 
can be minimized through proper truck maintenance and responsible operation 
(Ramachandra 2006). Noise from the fans can be minimized through the use of walls, 
fences, trees, and landscaped earthen barriers (Ramachandra 2006).  
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Aesthetic Impact: 
  Two aesthetic concerns when developing incinerators are their odour impact on the 
surrounding environment as well as their physical appearance, which some may find 
unpleasant. Odour concerns can be addressed by, keeping the process building at negative 
pressure and using internal air for combustion (Ramachandra 2006). This will prevent 
undesirable smells from escaping outside of the building. Concerns over the appearance 
of the building and the emission stack can be addressed by developing the facility in an 




 Modern incinerators come in two forms, either mass burning systems or advanced 












 Mass	  Burn	  Incinerator.	  Digital	  Image.	  Maine	  Friends.	  Accessed	  September	  2016.	  
https://mainefriends.wordpress.com/page/2/ 
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Mass burning systems are the most widely used and technically proven incineration 
technology. It is a waste incineration process where the waste is burned in a large furnace 
with no significant pre-processing of the raw waste (MacViro 2006). Recyclable metals 
are recovered from the bottom ash after combustion (MacViro 2006). The only required 
pre-processing is the removal of oversized items such as mattresses that cannot fit into 
the incinerator’s feeder (Ramachandra 2006). Mass burn systems are used to generate 
energy and heat from the incineration of waste, recover recyclable metals from the waste 
stream that would otherwise be lost in landfills, and minimize the amount of land needed 
for waste disposal (Psomopoulos, Bourka and Themelis 2009).  
 
 In a mass burn system post-recycled waste is received in an enclosed tipping area, 
which is designed to minimize dust, odour, and noise emissions (MacViro 2005). Waste 
is then dumped into a receiving pit where it is inspected by the feed crane operator for 
any visibly unacceptable materials, such as objects that are too large to fit into the 
combustion chamber. Unacceptable materials are removed and waste is then fed via a 
grabble crane into the combustion chamber (MacViro 2005). The combustion chamber 
uses an inclined moving grate system, which moves the waste through the drying, 
ignition, and combustion stages of the incineration process. Air is added to the chamber 
to optimize combustion in each of the above-mentioned stages (MacViro 2005). Water is 
circulated throughout the walls of the boiler, which creates steam that is used to drive 
turbines that produce energy. Ash is discharged from the bottom of the grate and is 
cooled with water. This ash (known as bottom ash) is then processed to recover any 
metals within (MacViro 2005).  
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 The combustion gas that is produced during the burning of the waste is called ‘flue 
gas’. “Flue gases contain mercury, dioxins/ furans, particulate matter, acid gases, and 
oxides of nitrogen (NOx)” (MacViro 2005). The flue gas is treated to remove hazardous 
components and neutralizes noxious gases. This process involves: Controlling acid gases 
such as oxides of sulphur (Sox) and hydrochlorides (HCI) with either a lime slurry 
scrubber or a dry lime scrubber (MacViro 2005). Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions are 
reduced using a urea injection into the flue gases. This process is known as ‘Selective 
Non-Catalytic Reduction (SNCR) or a ‘Selective Catalytic Reactor’ (SCR) process 
(MacViro 2005). Mercury and dioxins/ furans are controlled using a ‘Powdered Activated 
Carbon System’ (MacViro 2005). Particulate matter is removed using a high-efficiency 
fabric filter or bag house. The cleaned exhaust gases are then discharged to the 
atmosphere via a stack. (MacViro 2005) The treatment of the flue gas produces a 
byproduct called fly ash, which is comprised of water and salts. The fly ash is a solid 
hazardous waste and is disposed of accordingly (MacViro 2005). 
 
 Advantages of Mass Burn Systems 
• Lowest potential impacts to water and land (MacViro 2006). 
• Least potential to disrupt sensitive habitats (MacViro 2006). 
• Greatest energy generation - both renewable and total (MacViro 2006). 
• Higher reliability due to minimum dependence on export to landfill (MacViro 
2006). 
• Costs, although high are comparable to mechanical and biological treatment 
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systems (MacViro 2006).  
• Most widely used and reliable thermal treatment technology. It is used in over 
80% of the waste-to-energy facilities in the USA (Psomopoulos, Bourka and 
Themelis 2009). 
• Less costly than advanced thermal technologies (MacViro 2006). 
 Disadvantages of Mass Burn Systems 
• Highest potential impacts on the air environment 
• Requires management of hazardous residues from the pollution control system 
(MacViro 2006) 
Advanced Thermal Treatment Facilities: 
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 Advanced thermal treatment facilities use either a technology called pyrolysis or 
gasification. These two processes are very similar, the main difference being that 
pyrolysis processes the waste in a oxygen free environment whereas gasification involves 
the partial oxidation of the waste (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 
2013). Unlike traditional combustion units advanced thermal treatment facilities do not 
put the waste directly into heat source. Instead it utilizes external heat to process the 
waste, which has been placed in either an oxygen free or minimally oxidized containment 
unit (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2013). Advanced thermal 
treatment units cannot handle unsorted municipal waste. Glass, metals, and inert 
materials such as rubble must be removed prior to processing (Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2013). These materials are removed through 
mechanical treatment. This system reduces the volume of waste going to landfill to 
approximately 10-15% of what it was initially (MacViro 2006). 
 
 The processing waste using advanced thermal treatment technologies results in two 
by-products, a solid residue (char) and a synthesis gas (syngas) (MacViro 2006). The 
char is made up of the non-combustible materials in the waste stream and carbon. The 
syngas is comprised of a mixture of gasses (MacViro 2006). The syngas can be cooled 
and condensed in order to produce oils, waxes, and tars that can be used as fuel for 
reciprocating engines, gas turbines, or as an alternative to natural gas for steam boilers 
(MacViro 2006). This gas has a much lower calorific value to natural gas ‘4 - 10 MJ / 
Nm3’ as opposed to ’38 MJ / Nm3’ (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 
2013). Most commercial gasification facilities utilize a secondary combustion chamber to 
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burn the syngas and recover energy via a steam circuit. (Department for Environment 
Food & Rural Affairs 2013)  
 
 Advantages of Advanced Thermal Treatment 
• Identical advantages to a mass burn system with the additional benefit of: 
o Potential to recover more recyclables such as plastics and metals, than a 
mass burn system. 
o Potential improvements in air emissions (MacViro Consultants Inc. 
2006). 
 Disadvantages of Advanced Thermal Treatment 
• Identical disadvantages to a mass burn system with the addition of: 
o Technology is less proven than mass burn. 
o More expensive to build and operate than mass burn (MacViro 2006). 
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Other Waste Disposal Technologies:  
Mechanical and Biological Treatment: 
  
Mechanical and Biological Treatment Flow. Digital Image. Science Pole. Accessed September 2016. 
http://sciencepole.com/mechanical-biological-treatment/ 
 
 Mechanical Biological Treatment (MBT) is a waste treatment process that involves 
integrating several types of waste management processes such as materials recovery and 
anaerobic digestion into a single facility. The different types of processes can be 
incorporated into an MBT facility in a variety of ways in order to best meet a desired 
function (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2012). MBT facilities divert 
around 33% of the waste that will ultimately go to landfill. (MacViro 2006). MBT 
facilities are typically used for pre-treatment of waste and diverting recyclable and 
biodegradable materials away from landfill.  
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 MBT facilities can be configured in a variety of ways each with their own unique 
process. A typical process involves three steps. 
  Step 1: Preparation of MSW - This stage involves preparing the MSW so that 
it can easily processed by the machines in the subsequent steps (Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2012). This involves removing all large bulky items 
that could cause problems with the processing equipment, such as mattresses and rugs, 
splitting open garbage bags to release the items inside, and shredding the waste to make it 
smaller and more suitable for later processes (Department for Environment Food & Rural 
Affairs 2012).  
  Step 2: Waste Separation - This stage involves sorting the waste into different 
groups using mechanical means. Waste is separated into different materials, which are 
suitable for different end uses such as material recycling, biological treatment, energy 
recovery through the production of RDF/ biomass, and landfill (Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2012).  
  Step 3: Biological Treatment - The organics from the sorted MSW is then 
biologically treated to produce a stabilized output for disposal and biogas, which can be 
captured and used for energy (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2012). 
There are three options for biological treatment of MSW. Option 1 is ‘aerobic bio-drying/ 
bio-stabilization’. This involves the partial composting of the waste (Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2012). Option 2 is ‘aerobic in-vessel composting’. 
This option is used to either bio-stabilize the MSW for landfilling or process organic rich 
MSW that has been sorted into workable compost (Department for Environment Food & 
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Rural Affairs 2012). Option 3 is ‘anaerobic digestion’. This option is used to process 
organic MSW into compost (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 2012).  
 Advantages of Mechanical and Biological Treatment: 
• This system has the lowest potential impacts on the air environment (MacViro 
2006). 
• Flexible to changes in waste quantities and composition (MacViro 2006). 
• “Potentially lower overall system costs provided low cost landfill capacity can 
be obtained from a third party” (MacViro 2006). 
• Potential to increase diversion rates through the recovery of additional 
recyclables. Advanced thermal treatment systems share this advantage 
(MacViro 2006). 
 Disadvantages of Mechanical and Biological Treatment: 
• Greatest potential to disrupt sensitive habitat due to heavy reliance on landfill 
(MacViro 2006). 
• Lowest energy generation (MacViro 2006). 
• Greatest potential social impact on the landfill host community (MacViro 
2006). 








Basic Sanitary Landfill. Digital Image. Ateneo Green Juris. Accessed September 2016. 
http://www.oocities.org/green_juris/landfil.html 
 
  Sanitary landfills are simply landfills that are designed to mitigate the effects of 
leachate and gas production, which are the major hazards associated landfilling. Leachate 
is the polluted water that flows from landfills. If improperly managed it can contaminate 
the land, surface water, and groundwater surrounding the landfill (Ramachandra 2006). 
The anaerobic decomposition of the organic matter within the landfill results in a 
methane rich gas to be produced. This gas is toxic and contributes to global warming 
(Ramachandra 2006).  
 
 Sanitary landfills control gas emissions by restricting the amount of organic waste 
that is allowed within the site as well as the moisture content within the waste  
(Ramachandra 2006). They also place vents called extraction wells within the waste to 
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remove the gas from the site and reduce gas pressure (Ramachandra 2006). Leachate is 
controlled through the use of natural and synthetic liners that prevent the leachate from 
escaping from the landfill into the surrounding groundwater. Natural liners refer to land 
that is minimally permeable and resistant to chemical attack such as compacted clay or 
shale (Ramachandra 2006). Synthetic liners made of either high or medium density 
polyethylene are used in combination with the natural liners in order to enhance the 
overall efficiency of the containment system (Ramachandra 2006). Synthetic liners form 
the base of the landfill. Drainpipes, collection pipes, and sumps are installed above the 
liner to collect the leachate (Ramachandra 2006).  
 
 Advantages of Sanitary Landfills: 
• This system has a relatively low potential impact on the air environment. 
• The most flexible to changes in waste quantities and composition. 
• Lowest overall system costs.  
 Disadvantages of Sanitary Landfills:   
• Wind can blow litter and dust outside of the landfill causing a nuisance 
(Ramachandra 2006). 
• Waste collection vehicles moving in and out of the vicinity can be noisy and 
disruptive to the surrounding neighbourhood (Ramachandra 2006). 
• Disease carrying birds, vermin, insects, and animals are often attracted to the 
landfill, which has the potential to cause a public health problem 
(Ramachandra 2006). 
• Water during heavy rain has the potential to run-off the landfill and enter 
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nearby bodies of water if drains and ditches have not been properly 
designed and constructed (Ramachandra 2006). 
• Aesthetically unpleasing (Ramachandra 2006). 
• Requires a large amount of land (Ramachandra 2006) 
  
 In this chapter we looked at different waste disposal options, their processes, and 
the positives and negatives associated with each. Incineration technologies were found to 
be the most cost effective do to minimal land requirements, had the greatest energy 
recovery potential and were the least damaging to sensitive habits as well as the ground 
and water environment. Incinerators were however found to pose the biggest threat to the 
air environment. Mechanical and biological treatment (MBT) was the most costly option 
but offered the greatest recyclable material recovery and the lowest impact on the air 
environment. Sanitary landfills have a relatively low impact on the air environment and a 
low system cost. They do however require a lot of land and have the biggest social cost. 
Both incineration and MBT will ultimately require their byproducts be deposited into a 
landfill. An ideal system would utilize all three systems. It would start with at source 
separation such as home recycling and composting programs. This would be followed by 
MBT to sort out and recycle anything that was improperly disposed of at source and 
compost the organics. The residuals would then be sent to an energy-from-waste 
incinerator, which would cause significantly less harmful to the environment if all of the 
feed was properly sorted beforehand. Finally the ash from the incinerator would then be 
sent to a sanitary landfill. Doing all this would minimize damage to the environment and 
produce the most energy, recyclables, and compost. It would however be the most costly 
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by a significant margin.  
 In the next chapter I will be looking at the opposition towards the DYEC in order to 
understand the public’s perceptions of incinerators as well as how their concerns are 
responded to by decision makers.  
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Chapter 4 - Community Opposition To Incinerators:  
 
In this chapter I will discuss the opposition to the DYEC. I will go over the 
opposition’s arguments against the development of incinerators, how they attempted to 
stop the development of the incinerator, and their proposed waste management alternative 
to incineration. I will explain how incineration proponents reacted to the arguments of the 
opposition movement. I will discuss the post-development controversy surrounding the 
DYEC. Finally, I will explain what the opposition movement accomplished through their 
actions.  
 
Arguments Made By DYEC Opposition Movement: 
 
Incinerators Harm Human and Environmental Health: 
‘Prevent Cancer Now’ an advocacy group working to eliminate preventable 
causes of cancer throughout Canada spoke out against the development of the DYEC. 
They argued “even the most technologically advanced incinerators release dioxins and 
other hazardous pollutants” (Gasser 2009). The International Agency for the Research on 
Cancer (IARC) has recognized dioxins as a class 1 carcinogen. This means that their 
research has found that dioxins have a high potential to cause cancer in humans (IARC 
2016). Studies on people living near incinerators in various counties such as France, 
Japan, Italy and Sweden, found that they were significantly more likely to have stomach, 
colorectal, liver, and lung cancers than those who did not live near an incinerator (Gasser 
2009). Studies were also done on children living near incinerators in the United 
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Kingdom. These studies found an increased risk of “childhood cancer, childhood 
leukemia, and solid tumors of all kinds” (Gasser 2009). The citizens environmental lobby 
‘DurhamCLEAR’ argues that incineration emissions negatively impact more than just the 
immediate area surrounding the facility. These emissions spread over lakes, rivers, and 
farms where they become absorbed into the food chain (DurhamCLEAR 2010).  
 
According to DurhamCLEAR, “air pollution is the principal cause of asthma and 
a leading contributor to heart disease, cancer and other diseases” (DurhamCLEAR 2010). 
They explain that even before the development of the incinerator, Clarington had one of 
the most polluted air sheds in Ontario largely due to the presence of a cement 
manufacturing facility (DurhamCLEAR 2010). Additionally, Durham Region as a whole 
had some of the highest numbers of reported asthma cases (DurhamCLEAR 2010). 
DurhamCLEAR argued that the addition of the incinerator would only make a bad 
situation worse.   
 
Waste Incinerators are also a significant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions 
according to ‘Durham Environment Watch’. This group explained that mass burn 
incinerators produce more grams of greenhouse gases per kWh than coal fired power 
plants (Durham Environment Watch 2010). Coal fired power plants are notorious for 
their negative environmental impact. The Province of Ontario banned coal-fired energy 
generation in 2015 (MOECC 2015).   
 
The Algonquin Power Facility (now called Emerald Energy From Waste) is a 
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waste-to-energy incinerator located in Brampton, Ontario. It processed 174,000 tonnes of 
the Region of Peel’s waste annually from 1992 until 2012 when Peel’s contract ended 
(Javed 2015). Opponents of the DYEC sited Brampton’s 2006 Air Emissions Monthly 
Summary, which reported that the city’s air shed had exceedances of carbon monoxide, 
hydrogen chloride gas, and nitrogen oxides (Bracken 2009b). These opponents believed 
that this data debunked the myth of “clean” incinerators that produce no negative 
emissions. 
 
The Region’s pledge to Clarington in their host community agreement to monitor 
the “total particulate matter emissions from the incinerator” was not included in 
certificate of approval (CofA) that was issued by the Ministry of the Environment 
(Hatherly 2011). The CofA only contained guidelines about monitoring the filterable 
particulate matter. Total particulate matter includes both filterable and condensable 
matter (Hatherly 2011). This became an issue when it was revealed that the incinerator 
could emit up to 21 micrograms per cubic metre of total particulate matter (Hatherly 
2011). This far exceeded the 9 micrograms that was agreed upon in the host community 
agreement. The health risk assessment done during the approval process for the facility 
studied the risk up to 10 micrograms per cubic metre would have on human health 
(Hatherly 2011). Clarington council requested that the health risk assessment be redone 
to understand the effects these higher levels of emissions will have. The Ministry of the 
Environment denied this request on the grounds that there was “no difference in health 
risk between the two levels” (Hatherly 2011).  Residents were upset by the Ministry’s 
response, saying that if the Ministry is going to claim that there is no difference in health 
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risk between the two levels of emissions they need to support that claim with data. These 
residents also reported feeling that the Ministry was not acting in their best interest 
(Hatherly 2011). 
 
Incinerators are Expensive: 
Opponents of the DYEC criticized the ever-ballooning costs of the facility. The 
cost of the facility grew from the initially projected $197 million to over $284 million 
(Joyce 2010). The former president of CUPE Ontario, Sid Ryan, explained that it is 
common practice in public private partnerships for companies to underbid on the tenders 
just to get the project going, “then the taxpayer is on the hook for the cost overruns” 
(Joyce 2010). The Federal Gas Tax Reserve Fund financed $100 million of the projects 
costs. Durham and York planned on getting additional funding from tipping fees and 
energy sales (Joyce 2010). Tipping fees, which were set at $140-per-tonne, is what 
Durham and York charge for accepting waste at the site. The energy produced at the site 
would be sold to the Ontario Power Authority at a rate of “8 cents per kilowatt-hour”. 
(Joyce 2010) This is almost three times the rate the Ontario Power Authority would 
charge its customers for using that energy (Joyce 2010). The Ontario Power Authority 
was directed to purchase this energy at that high rate by George Smitherman, who was 
Ontario’s Energy and Infrastructure Minister (Joyce 2010). Critics argue that this 
purchase order effectively acts as an additional subsidy on the facility paid for by 
taxpayers (Joyce 2010). 
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Incinerators Compete With Diversion Programs: 
Opponents of incineration argue that incinerators create a disincentive for 
improving waste diversion as they compete with recycling programs for resources. 
Incinerators depend on a steady flow of garbage in order to run efficiently, this inherently 
undermines a municipality’s incentive to bolster diversion programs. Aside from the 
sheer quantity of waste needed, the amount of energy produced at a waste-to-energy 
incinerator depends on the content of the waste used as feedstock (Nelson 2009). 
Recyclables such as plastics, wood waste, and paper have the highest energy potential. 
The higher the percentage of these materials in the feedstock, the more energy the 
incinerator will produce (Nelson 2009). This gives yet another disincentive to improve 
waste diversion programs. Critics argue that despite being a high energy source of fuel 
for the incinerators, recycling these materials would conserve more energy than what 
would be gained by using them as a fuel source (Nelson 2009). A paper put out by the 
Recycling Council of British Columbia confirmed this argument (Nelson 2009). That 
being the case, it would make sense to forgo incineration as an energy production system 
and instead increase recycling programming.  
 
Another disincentive for bolstering recycling programs and reducing waste is a 
financial one. The Region signed a “put or pay” contract with the facility operator 
(Nelson 2010). In the contract the Region agreed to supply 140,000 tonnes of waste to the 
facility every year. “Put or pay” means that the Region would have to pay the facility 
operator anywhere between $200-$400 for every tonne of garbage that is missing from 
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the agreed upon 140,000 (Nelson 2010). This is a major financial disincentive for the 
Region to encourage people to reduce the amount of garbage they produce.   
 
Insufficient Emission Monitoring Programs: 
Representatives of the community group ‘Zero Waste 4 Zero Burning’ criticized 
Durham and York regions after they voted to reject the use of ambient air monitoring 
around the DYEC (Gasser 2009b). This vote came after recommendations coming from a 
study on the pollution control technologies and emission standards done by the project 
consultants that recommended the technology not be used. The report explains that the 
majority of ambient air monitoring and environmental monitoring (vegetation and 
agricultural products) studies done on modern incinerators were “unable to find 
significant chemical concentrations that would adversely affect human health” (Jacques 
Whitford 2009). Therefore they said that they were unable to justify recommending the 
use of these monitoring systems. The consultants ultimately recommended that the region 
implement chemical emission standards that were more stringent than those set out by 
both Ontario and the European Union’s (EU) guidelines (Jacques Whitford 2009). They 
also recommended including a stack sampling technology to collect samples of dioxin 
and furans that can later be measured at regular intervals (Jacques Whitford 2009). 
Unlike the combustion gases CO, O2, NOx, HCI, and SO2, dioxins and furans cannot be 
continuously monitored at source (Jacques Whitford 2009). The sampling technology 
allows for more frequent measuring of these emissions. The consultant’s study concluded 
that these two recommendations go beyond what would be considered good practice 
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(Jacques Whitford 2009). Despite this justification, community groups still voiced that 
they would feel safer with ambient air monitoring put in place.  
 
Choosing a Site Prior to Choosing a Technology:  
 Durham and York regions were criticized for selecting a site for the incinerator 
before they had selected the technology to be used. Clarington City Council passed a 
motion to ask that the site selection be delayed until a technology had been selected, as 
did Durham region’s own health and social services committee (Szekely 2008). Dr. Tony 
van der Vooren, an engineering and development consultant, explains that one would 
need to know what technology will be used before they can determine how the 
development of an incinerator will affect the air shed of the site (Stone 2007). He says 
that certain technologies may not be suitable for particular sites. The best practice is to 
first select the technology and then choose two potential sites and do studies on both to 
find out the impacts of the development (Stone 2007). What may seem like an ideal site 
at first glance may turn out not to be after the completion of the studies. According to 
Vooren, the information on air quality indicators available to consultants prior to 
performing site-specific studies are often too old and basic to allow decision makers to 
make the best possible choice (Stone 2007). Cliff Curtis, the Durham Works Director, 
responded to Vooren saying, “carrying two sites forward into technology selection would 
be too costly” (Stone 2007). Vooren agreed that it would be more expensive but not 
unreasonable so (Stone 2007).  
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Issues with Covanta: 
 Covanta Energy Corp. is the builder and operator of the DYEC. They are also the 
primary funders of the Canadian Energy From Waste Coalition, an incineration lobbyist 
group (Nelson 2010b). They are the world’s largest waste-to-energy (WTE) company, 
owning 44 WTE facilities in the United States and more internationally (Nelson 2010b). 
Durham Council voted to award the project to Covanta at a regional council meeting in 
June 2009. This decision was made after council heard from over 80 delegates over the 
course of a 16-hour committee meeting on June 25th (Pietroniro 2009). An 
overwhelming majority of the delegates came to speak out against the incinerator (Nelson 
2010b). The delegates concerns revolved around the incinerator’s impact on human and 
environmental health, effects on real estate prices and taxes, as well as Covanta’s 
environmental track record (Pietroniro 2009).  Several cities in the United States have 
fined Covanta for unsafe labour practices and toxic emission exceedances. The 
municipality of Pittsfield in Massachusetts fined Covanta in 2008 after tests found their 
incinerator was emitting dioxins and furans that were 350% greater than the allowable 
rate (Funston 2009). Chester, Pennsylvania and Newark, New Jersey also fined Covanta 
in 2008 for violating air pollution regulations (Funston 2009). In May 2008, the ‘U.S. 
National Labour Relations Board’ issued a complaint against Covanta for, “maintaining 
illegal work rules at 46 of its facilities” (Funston 2009). In April and again in June 2009, 
Covanta was charged by the ‘Occupation Health and Safety Administration’ for various 
workplace safety violations including “exposing workers to electrical hazards” and 
“storing combustible acetylene cylinders next to oxygen cylinders” (Editorial 2009). 
Covanta became a point of controversy again in 2011 after they were charged $400,000 
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for emitting unsafe levels of dioxin emissions at its waste incinerator in Connecticut 
(Nearing 2011).  
 
Incinerators Effect On Property Values: 
 One concern repeatedly raised by citizens at council meetings was the effect the 
incinerator would have on their property values. Clarington resident Dr. Maria Lit 
referenced a study that aimed to find out how incinerators affected nearby housing 
markets in the United States (Gilligan 2009). According to Dr. Lit, this study found that 
“house values dropped 10% in the vicinity of an incinerator” (Gilligan 2009). While 
some citizens brought up this concern at council meetings, it was not used as an anti-
incineration argument by the various NGOs fighting the facility.  
 
How Incinerator Opponents Fought the Development of the DYEC:  
 
Residents Formed Anti-Incineration Groups and Collaborated With NGOs: 
 Residents of Durham Region formed community groups in order to better mobilize 
against the incinerator. These groups were DurhamCLEAR, Zero Waste 4 Zero Burning, 
and Durham Environment Watch. These groups worked in conjunction with other NGOs 
to help spread their message. Notable NGOs that worked to prevent the DYEC were 
Prevent Cancer Now, Durham Region Labour Council, Canadian Union of Public 
Employees (CUPE), Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW), and Greenpeace Canada.  
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Voiced Opposition at Public Meetings: 
 Droves of opposition attended every municipal and regional council meeting, and 
PIC from the time it was announced that Durham and York Regions were considering 
building an incinerator in 2006 until development of the facility finally began in 2011. 
These meetings had an overwhelming number of incinerator opponents versus supporters. 
An example of one of these meetings occurred in May 2007, shortly after it was 
announced that Clarington was on the short list of potential sites for a proposed waste 
incinerator, Clarington city council hosted a public meeting for citizens to voice their 
opinions on the matter. Out of the 18 delegates that came forward to speak on the issue, 
17 were against the development (Stone 2007b). They said that Clarington should refuse 
to be a willing host to an incinerator. They voiced concerns about emissions and 
“potential toxicity of ash left after the incineration process” (Stone 2007b). They argued 
that the city’s goal should be to improve waste diversion instead of develop an 
incinerator, which requires large amounts of waste for fuel (Stone 2007b). Dr. Debra 
Jefferson, a family physician based in Newcastle, explained at the meeting that there are 
various studies in reputable medical journals that showed increased mercury levels for 
those who live near incinerators. She also said that, “there are two cancers that are 
particularly associated with incineration: non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma and soft-tissue 
sarcoma” (Stone 2007b). 
 
 Another example of overwhelming opposition to the incinerator occurred at a 
meeting in September 2007. At this meeting the Durham/ York Residual Waste Study 
Joint Management Group voted to accept the project consultant’s recommendation to 
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build the waste incinerator in Clarington at the corner of Hwy. 401 and Courtice Road 
(Willoughby 2007). The group, which is made up of members from both York and 
Durham regional councils, chose this site from a short list that included 1 site in East 
Gwillimbury and 4 sites in Clarington (Willoughby 2007). They committee explained 
that they chose the site because it minimizes the distance trucks needed to travel in order 
to transport the waste from the two regions. The site also has the least number of 
residences living within a 1-kilometer radius (Willoughby 2007). The consultant’s report 
did note that the site’s proximity to Hwy. 401 already caused it to have air quality issues 
as a result of the heavy traffic, which would only be made worse with the addition of the 
incinerator. The report explained that while the East Gwillimbury site did not have the 
pre-existing air quality issues that were found in Clarington, the remoteness of that site 
would make it very inefficient to transport the waste (Willoughby 2007). The Joint 
Management Group heard from members of the public before making their decision. 
Every delegate that came up voiced opposition to the development of the incinerator 
(Willoughby 2007). Their opposition was not directed at the chosen location but rather to 
the very idea of developing an incinerator (Willoughby 2007). 
 
Clarington Residents Hosted Their Own Public Information Sessions: 
 Residents of Durham hosted their own community information sessions to inform 
the public about the development proposal and the risks associated with incineration. The 
organizers felt that the public information sessions hosted by the Region were too one 
sided in favour of incineration and did not explain the full story (Bracken 2009). They 
explained that the Region had not “fully considered the health risks and financial 
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implications incineration, which is one of the most costly methods of disposing of 
municipal waste” (Bracken 2009). The first of these information sessions took place in 
November 2008 and had over a hundred attendees. One attendee, Dianne Cross, said that 
she had no idea that an incinerator was being proposed until being informed about this 
community run information night (Bracken 2009). Other groups also hosted their own 
public forums including the Canadian Auto Workers Union. Their event ran as an expo, 
with various organizations setting up information tables, including the Region of Durham 
(Szekely 2008b). The Durham Region booth gave out information about their blue box 
and green bin recycling and competing programs, not their proposed incinerator (Szekely 
2008b). The event included lectures from various speakers explaining the dangers of 
incineration as well as options to increase waste diversion such as through the use of 
clear plastic bags. 
 
Organized Protests Against Incinerator: (See	  Appendix	  Fig	  2	  for	  photos	  from	  protests	  and	  PICs)	  	  
Protestors came out in force to voice their opposition against the DYEC at many 
key events leading up to the project. In February 2008, a protest group of over 100 people 
gathered outside of a council meeting in Clarington Ontario (Liebregts 2008). This group 
mobilized in response to Mayor Jim Abernathy’s decision to invite several pro-
incineration delegations to speak at the meeting, while opting not to invite any 
incineration opponents (Liebregts 2008). Mayor Abernathy defended his actions by 
saying that “there will also be experts in other forms of waste management, including 
landfill and Zero Waste strategies, invited to future meetings” (Liebregts 2008).  
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In May 2009, protestors were again seen outside of the Clarington municipal 
building in response to an announcement that Clarington councilors would be voting on 
whether or not to reverse their previous decision that they would be an unwilling host to 
the DYEC (Gilligan 2009c). This vote was put forward after Clarington received a 
proposal that they would receive a $650,000 payment in-lieu of property tax and $10 per 
tonne for the waste sent to the incinerator from outside of Durham and York regions if 
they agreed to rescind their unwilling host status (Gilligan 2009c). The municipality 
would also receive sewer upgrades for the energy park (Gilligan 2009c). CUPE Ontario, 
Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW), and Prevent Cancer Now organized the rally 
(Gilligan 2009). Dr. Aubrey Kassirer, a family doctor in Clarington who attended this 
rally said, “Physicians around the world are opposed to incinerators. Clarington 
councilors who support an incinerator were selling out the community” (Gilligan 2009c). 
Dave Renaud, the president of CAW’s environmental council said, “all labour unions 
across Canada are opposed to incineration”. The protestors reported that they felt that 
their health was being traded for financial considerations (Gilligan 2009c).  
 
A second protest was held in May 2009, this one in front of Durham Regional 
headquarters (Gilligan 2009b). Approximately 40 people attended the rally (Gilligan 
2009b). They were there in advance of the Regional council’s June 24th vote on whether 
or not to go forward with the development of an incinerator in Clarington (Gilligan 
2009b). At that point only 10 out of the 28 regional councilors had publicly voiced 
opposition to the incinerator (Gilligan 2009b). The group was there to show the 
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remaining councilors that the public did not want the incinerator either and convince 
them to vote no.  
 
A large protest was held at Queen’s Park in Toronto in May 2010 prior to the 
DYEC receiving approval of their environmental assessment (PCN 2010). Protestors 
were calling on the Ontario Minister of the Environment John Gerretsen to reject the EA 
(PCN 2010). Protestors included citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
from all around the GTA (PCN 2010). Speeches were heard from representatives from 
various NGOs including, Prevent Cancer Now, The Toronto Environmental Alliance, and 
Greenpeace Canada (PCN 2010).  
 
Protestors attended the Durham Waste Fair in March 2011 (O’Meara 2011). They 
mobilized because they felt that the Region was using the fair to “promote its garbage 
policy, which includes incineration” (O’Meara 2011). They acted as a point of contact for 
attendees who wanted to hear the other side of the debate, not just the pro-incineration 
propaganda being pushed by Covanta and the Region.  
 
Over one hundred protestors showed up to the groundbreaking ceremony of the 
DYEC. They wore facemasks to symbolize their fear of the toxic emissions that would be 
emitted by the facility. Doug Anderson, the president of DurhamCLEAR, explained that 
they were protesting, “to show that opposition is still strong” (Vyhnak 2011). Oshawa 
councilor John Neal joined the protestors and stated, “this will go down in history as one 
of the worst decisions ever made” (Vyhnak 2011). There were 135 politicians who 
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attended the groundbreaking as guests. They were treated to a large catered party inside 
air-conditioned tents erected at the site. All attendees were also given miniature shovels 
to commemorate the event. Twenty police officers were hired to act as security for the 
event (Vyhnak 2011). The party cost $75,000, and the bill was evenly split between 
Durham and York Regions, and Covanta Energy (Gilligan 2011). The cost was highly 
criticized by residents of Durham. They voiced anger that taxpayer money was used to 
fund a private party (Gilligan 2011). A review was requested by two regional councilors 
to examine “where the money for the event came from, who authorized it and how much 
it cost to have Durham Regional Police provide security”. Durham Regional Council 
ultimately voted not to do the review in a 13-11 vote (Gilligan 2011). 
 
Attempts to Stop Incinerator Through Litigation: 
In July 2011, DurhamCLEAR, a lobbyist group that was formed to fight the 
development of the DYEC attempted to halt the development through the judicial system. 
They argued that the facility could not be developed at the chosen site because it was not 
compatible with the zoning in Clarington’s Official Plan (Gilligan 2011b). Stephen 
Waque, Durham Region’s lawyer argued that the zoning by-law does not apply in this 
situation because the Region has a “public use exemption” (Gilligan 2011b). Eric 
Gillespie, DurhamCLEAR’s lawyer, countered by arguing, “the ‘public use exemption’ 
can’t be used by the Region because Covanta will be building and operating the facility”. 
“The exemption can only be used by a public authority”. “Covanta is a private company. 
It does not appear to be, to our client, to be a public entity” (Gilligan 2011b). Waque 
countered by arguing that DurhamCLEAR does not have the right to bring this case to 
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court as it is not a taxpayer (Gilligan 2011b). He explained that, “you have to have an 
economic stake in a municipality to be able to bring a suit against a municipality. The 
applicant doesn’t have capacity or standing to bring an application” (Gilligan 2011b).  
 
The case ended before it came to a court hearing after Justice Peter Lauwers 
accepted Covanta’s request that DurhamCLEAR put up a ‘security of costs’ of $40,000 
(Follert 2012). If DurhamCLEAR were to lose the case against the Region and Covanta, 
this money would be used as security in the situation that the defendants sought to 
recover some of their expenses. DurhamCLEAR’s lawyer argued that the judge should 
deny the request for security of costs because there was no precedent for it in Canadian 
law in public interest litigation (Gilligan 2011b). Julie Parla, Covanta’s lawyer, countered 
saying, “there’s no legal rule that public interest litigants are immune from costs at the 
end of the day, nor for having to post securities” (Gilligan 2011b). Justice Laurders 
agreed with Parla saying, “[DurhamCLEAR] was trying to get a free crack at this, at the 
11th hour. There’s a price to be paid to put a wrench in this. You need to put some skin in 
the game. This thing has been aired publicly in a serious way” (Gilligan 2011b).   
 
DurhamCLEAR was forced to drop the lawsuit after they were unable to secure 
the funds to pay the $40,000 security of costs set by the judge (Follert 2012). After 
dropping the case the group announced that they would continue their fight to protect 
Durham from the incinerator by switching their focus to “monitoring the construction and 
operation of the energy-from-waste facility, to ensure it complies with the commitments 
that have been set out” (Follert 2012). Stacey Leadbetter, the vice-president of 
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DurhamCLEAR explained that the group’s experience fighting the DYEC has taught 
them that in order to be successful “you have to get onto issues at a very early stage or 
else they get away from you” (Follert 2012) 
 
Incinerator Opposition’s Proposed Waste Management Alternative: 
 
Zero Waste: 
 As an alternative to incineration, opponents of the DYEC suggested that steps be 
taken to move the region towards zero waste. Doing this involves, “designing and 
managing products and processes to reduce the volume and toxicity of waste and 
materials, conserve and recover all resources, and not burn or bury them” (ZWIA 2004). 
Advocates of zero waste believe that is possible to divert 90% of all waste while only 
landfilling the remaining 10% (ZWIA 2004). Some concrete steps that can be done to 
realize this goal are the utilization of consumer and producer stewardship programs, and 
the privatization of waste collection and disposal (Anderson 2001).  
 
Consumer stewardship programs involve making citizens bare the cost of 
disposing the waste they create. This will create a financial incentive for people to 
purchase products with minimal packaging, and in the case of electronics and appliances, 
more durable and longer lasting to reduce their disposal fees (Anderson 2001).  
 
Producer stewardship programs involve making regulations that standardize the 
types of product containers manufacturers are allowed to use and the utilization of bottle 
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deposits (Anderson 2001). These types of programs are important in bolstering the 
effectiveness of recycling programs. Both glass and plastics need to be carefully sorted 
by colour and in the case of plastics type as well in order for them to be recycled into 
high value products (Anderson 2001). Mixed glass and plastics are essentially worthless 
to a secondary market (Anderson 2001). Standardizing packaging and utilizing bottle 
deposit programs will greatly enhance the reuse potential and marketability of recycled 
packaging (Anderson 2001).  
 
Finally, cancelling municipal garbage collection programs to be replaced by 
private collection will have several effects on a person’s waste production habits. First, 
private collectors would charge people for each bag of garbage produced. People will be 
incentivized to reduce their waste to save on money (Anderson 2001). Second, private 
contractors can refuse to do business with anyone who is not complying with garbage/ 
recycling by-laws. Government owned waste collectors are not able to do this because the 
uncollected garbage would create health compliance issues (Anderson 2001). In the 
situation that a collector cancels their contract with a homeowner, they would report the 
cancellation to the government who has a registry of all taxpayers and the operators that 
have been contracted to handle their garbage. The government would then hire a garbage 
collection company to collect that persons waste and charge them a rate that is much 
higher than the going rate (Anderson 2001). Collection companies that accept waste that 
does not comply with garbage/ recycling by-laws could face the penalty of having their 
licenses taken away. Third, by being a privatized industry, collection companies can offer 
a range of services that municipal collection could not. For example, for an extra charge 
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they can offer to sort your garbage in your place, or collect the garbage from a designated 
location of the customer’s choice such as their backyards (as opposed to curb pick up) 
(Anderson 2001).    
 
Incinerator Proponents’ Response To Opposition: 
 
Downplayed Opposition As ‘Minimal’: 
 The public information sessions held as part of the Durham / York waste 
management study included open houses, presentations by the project consultants, and 
question-and-answer periods (Hatfield 2007). The public most commonly came with 
questions relating to air emissions, health impacts, traffic impacts, and concerns about the 
facility competing with waste diversion targets (Hatfield 2007). There were four 
information sessions held in April 2007 to inform the public about the short list of 
potential sites for the waste incinerator. Around 400 people attended these four meetings 
(Hatfield 2007). Jim McKay, one of the project consultants explained that those numbers 
signify relatively low levels of opposition. Around 1000 people would signify a high 
level of opposition according to the consultants. McKay explained that, “usually at this 
stage of a land-filling process we would have two or three thousand people out” (Hatfield 
2007). 
 
Opposition	  Was	  Dismissed	  As	  NIMBYism: 
In response to delegations calling for zero waste initiatives instead of incineration 
at a public consultation meeting in May 2007, Regional Councilor Charlie Trim said, “He 
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had been at a meeting about a year ago [2006] where only 12 people — four of them 
from Port Hope — attended. It’s only now, with the announcement that Clarington may 
play host, that people are getting involved” (Stone 2007c). Contrary to Trim’s comments, 
it is clear from information obtained from the Durham York Energy Centre website that 
there was already significant public interest in 2006. Hundreds of people attended the 
three PICs that were held in 2006 (Durham Region 2010). In March 2006, a PIC was held 
to discuss how to manage the Region’s residual waste, which had 215 attendees (Durham 
Region 2010). A PIC was held in May 2006 to obtain feedback from the public about 
their preferred technology, which had 300 attendees (Durham Region 2010). The third 
PIC in 2006 was held in September. “Hundreds” of people attended this PIC that aimed 
to obtain feedback about, which criteria should be prioritized when siting thermal 
treatment facilities (Durham Region 2010). 
 
Region Decided Consent Was Unnecessary: 
 Durham Regional Chairman, Roger Anderson, at a council meeting in September 
2007, told delegates, “it would be nice if we could have a willing host, but it is not 
essential” (Stone 2007d). He goes on to say that “if Clarington were to declare itself an 
unwilling host now, it would have absolutely no effect whatsoever on the site selection 
process, which is part of the ongoing EA” (Stone 2007d). In Ontario’s EA process for 
waste-to-energy incinerators the willingness of the host community is considered but it is 
not a determining factor (Stone 2007d). Attendees at the council meeting reported leaving 
with the feeling that the public consultation process was a farce. Kerry Meydam, a 
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Clarington resident said, “It seems like it’s a done deal and has been for a long, long time 
and we feel a little helpless” (Stone 2007d). 
 
 Durham Regional Councillor from Oshawa, Brian Nicholson, attempted to pass a 
motion that would require municipalities pass a resolution accepting the facility in their 
community before that municipality could be considered as a host (Gilligan 2006). He 
explained, "It has always been the policy that we would not impose a landfill; I think we 
should extend that policy to this process," (Gilligan 2006). This motion failed, with only 
3 of the 28 councillors voting in favour of it.  
 
Region Put Limits On Public Delegations at Council: 
 On Dec. 14 2011 Durham Region council voted on and passed a motion to reduce 
the amount of time delegates are allowed to speak at council meetings from 10 minutes 
down to 5 (Follert 2011). This motion also set a limit on how often a person can speak on 
a matter. Before the vote there were no limits to how often a delegate could speak on a 
topic, now they are only permitted to speak once on a topic in a six-month period (Follert 
2011). Linda Gasser, a frequent speaker at regional council meetings said that she felt this 
new change “limits public access to raise concerns or provide information to elected 
officials” (Follert 2011). From her experience, she says most delegates needed the full 10 
minutes to fully explain themselves. She also criticized the restriction on how frequently 
a person can talk about an issue. She explained that often information about complex 
issues, such as the development of an incinerator, grows and changes over time. People 
should be able to speak to council to respond to new information they have received even 
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if they have recently spoken on the topic (Follert 2011). Gasser believes that Durham 
regional council put these restrictions in place to “limit negative feedback on their 
actions” (Follert 2011). 
 
Post-Development Controversy Over Incinerator: 
 
Criticisms Over Increasing Emission Allowances in Closed Meetings: 
 On December 23, 2015 Durham Region announced that the DYEC had failed its 
emissions acceptance testing. The facility produced more ash than was acceptable under 
the contract between the region and the operator (McNaughton 2016). This 
announcement was made a day after a closed meeting between the regional committee of 
the whole, where councillors received a verbal update on the incinerator’s acceptance 
testing (McNaughton 2016). The committee of the whole had another closed meeting on 
Jan 27, 2016 where they voted to amend the contract between Durham and Covanta. This 
amendment gave Covanta permission to produce more ash at the DYEC (McNaughton 
2016). Members of the public and community groups expressed concern over not being 
allowed to attend these meetings. The region violated their trust by allowing the DYEC to 
produce more ash without consulting them first or even allow them to listen in on the 
discussion. Two formal complaints were issued, which triggered an investigation into 
whether the two meetings should have been open to the public (McNaughton 2016). The 
investigation found that the two meetings were improperly closed to the public. The 
report notes that there were parts of the two meetings that were rightfully done in a closed 
session, specifically, the settlement proposal from Covanta (McNaughton 2016b). The 
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report states, “members of council needed to hear the without-prejudice settlement 
proposal, and accompanying legal advice, in order to determine whether or not to settle 
the proceeding” (McNaughton 2016b).  
 
The meeting minutes from these two sessions were released alongside the 
investigation report. The sections that were found to have been appropriately discussed in 
a closed meeting were blacked out. Members of the public argued that some of these 
blacked out sections should have been left untouched. For example, two of the four 
principles of acceptance testing were blacked out and hidden from public viewing 
(Editorial 2016). The question that was raised was, “why can’t residents know the 
principles that were being tested?” (Editorial 2016). Veils of secrecy such as this, only 
work to grow the public’s distrust in government.  
 
DYEC Boiler Shut Down Due to Excessive Emissions: 
 One of the two boilers in the Durham York Energy Centre had to be shut down 
after testing in July 2016 found that it was emitting dioxins and furans that were 1363% 
higher than allowable limits (Gilligan 2016). Operating data did not detect this problem 
(Gilligan 2016). This resulted in many residents feeling concerned about the health of 
those living near the facility and the effects those emissions could have on the 
surrounding agriculture (Gilligan 2016). During the approval process the public had been 
told that “there is no health risk” and that the incinerator would be “the best of the best” 
(Gilligan 2016). Members of the public have reported feeling a lack of trust and 
confidence in the incinerator, the operating company, and the government as a result of 
	   69	  
this boiler failure (Gilligan 2016). Covanta was ordered to take the boiler offline and 
conduct a full investigation into why it was producing such high emissions (McNaughton 
2016c). The tests on the second boiler found that it was producing emissions below the 
allowable rate (McNaughton 2016c).  
 
Covanta’s investigation found that the high emissions were the result of 
unplanned operational changes. On May 5th 2016 a mattress blocked one of the 
incinerator’s feed chutes. The boiler had to be shut down in order to remove the mattress 
and clean the chute. The unplanned shut off and the cleaning of the boiler likely caused 
the problem according to the report (McNaughton 2016d). Despite Covanta’s claims that 
such exceedances would not happen again, many members of the public and several 
regional councillors voiced a lack of faith that “Covanta will get things right in the 
future” (McNaughton 2016d). The region’s commissioner of health, Dr. Robert Kyle, 
who had tried to reassure the public that the incinerator posed no risk to human health 
during the development approval process, voiced some concern over the high levels of 
emissions. He explained, “sustained excessive emissions of dioxins and furans are a 
potential human health hazard, primarily by entering the food chain” (McNaughton 
2016d). He said that he was surprised that the Ministry of the Environment and Climate 
Change (MOECC) were not planning on taking any regulatory action to find out the root 
cause of the problem and take corrective action to prevent it from reoccurring 
(McNaughton 2016d). He suggests that, “more tests like the ones that detected the 
exceedance are needed in the future” (McNaughton 2016d). 
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Accomplishments of DYEC Opposition Movement: 
 
Opposition Discouraged The Development of Other Incinerators: 
 While the opponents of the DYEC failed to prevent its development their efforts 
had significant consequences elsewhere. Durham Region’s announcement that they were 
planning on developing an incinerator to manage their waste resulted in other 
municipalities looking into doing the same thing. In 2013, the Regional Municipality of 
Peel approved a $500 million dollar budget to be put towards a waste incinerator. They 
cancelled their plans for this development in January 2016 (Javed 2016). Mississauga 
Councillor Carolyn Parish explained that that she had voted to cancel the plan as a result 
of ballooning costs, and that she was concerned that an incinerator in Peel Region would 
suffer from similar delays, controversy, and high emissions that plagued the Durham 
York Energy Centre (Javed 2016). To manage their waste problem, Peel Region has 
decided to increase their waste diversion targets from 60% to 75%. As of January 2016, 
their actual diversion rates were sitting at 46% (Javed 2016). If Peel were to meet these 
diversion targets they would not be able to supply enough waste to feed their proposed 
waste incinerator, which would have required 300,000 tonnes of garbage per year. A 75% 
diversion rate would only leave 150,000 tonnes of residual waste for the incinerator 
(Javed 2016).    
 
 In 2004 The Regions of Halton and Hamilton started looking into developing a 
shared garbage incinerator (McGuinness 2008). Despite recommendations from their 
consultants that an incinerator would be the best method to manage their waste, the two 
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municipalities abandoned this plan in 2008 after strong opposition from the public 
(McGuinness 2008). Hamilton said that their current landfill capacity would be sufficient 
until the year 2050 so long as waste diversion increased to 65% by 2011 (McGuinness 
2008). At the time of this announcement in 2008, the city was diverting 42% of its 
household waste away from landfill (McGuinness 2008).  
 
 A proposal to build a private for-profit incinerator in Port Hope, Ontario was 
turned down in 2014, after a 5-year environmental assessment process (Cruickshank 
2015). The rejection was the result of a very large anti-incineration campaign run by the 
people of Port Hope (Cruickshank 2015). The municipal council listened and 
subsequently voted to not make the zoning changes needed to develop the incinerator 
(Cruickshank 2015). The proponents, Entech-REM, took the case to the Ontario 
Municipal Board (OMB) to appeal the council’s decision (Argyris 2015). The OMB 
decided not to overrule Port Hope council’s decision stating, “In the absence of a report 
on human health and ecological risk assessment council could not have been expected to 
rule favourably on the proposal. The OMB would not stand against council in these 
circumstances” (Argyris 2015). 
 
Helped Shape Ontario’s Current Waste Management Strategy: 
In June 2016, the province of Ontario passed the ‘Waste-Free Ontario Act’ and a 
draft waste diversion strategy called the ‘Strategy for a Waste-Free Ontario: Building the 
Circular Economy’ (MOECC 2016). This act incorporates many of the waste 
management alternatives suggested by incineration opponents and zero waste advocates. 
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The act was designed to improve waste diversion by incentivizing innovative recycling 
processes and increasing producer responsibility over their products and packaging 
(MOECC 2016b). The only mention of EFW incinerators in the draft strategy is to clarify 
that waste sent to these facilities will no longer contribute to diversion targets (MOECC 
2016b). The development of EFW is allowed in the new act but is not promoted as a 
sustainable alternative to landfilling as it once was.  
 
 In this chapter I discussed the opposition to the DYEC. I went over the 
opposition’s arguments against the development of incinerators, how they attempted to 
stop the development of the incinerator, and their proposed waste management alternative 
to incineration. I explained how incineration proponents reacted to the arguments of the 
opposition movement. I discussed the post-development controversy surrounding the 
DYEC. Finally, I explained what the opposition movement accomplished through their 
actions. While the incinerator opponents were not able to stop the development of the 
DYEC, their actions made other municipalities apprehensive to go ahead with their own 
incinerator plans. They also encouraged the province to prioritize recycling and other 
waste diversion programs in their 2016 waste management strategy.  
 
 In the next chapter I will be looking at Judith Petts’ theoretical framework that 
tries to explain the motivations behind incinerator opposition and attempt to validate the 
theory using examples from the DYEC opposition movement.  
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Chapter 5 – Motivating Factors Behind Incinerator Opposition: 
 
In this chapter I will be looking at Judith Petts’ theory explaining the motivating 
factors behind public opposition to incinerator development. These factors are 
perceptions of risk, lack of trust, ineffective communication, and problems with the 
decision making process. I will also explore the events that occurred during the 
development process of the DYEC and connect them to the factors described by Petts.  
 
Public Perception of Risks: 
The public’s perceptions of an incinerator’s risks are the starting point behind 
incinerator opposition. According to Petts, people tend to experience “stress, social 
conflict, and direct opposition” when they believe their living situation is at risk (Petts 
1994). Incinerators tend to bring up fears of human and environmental health, fears of 
potential nuisances such as odours, dust, noise, and fears of declining property values 
(Petts 1994). These fears are what drive people to become actively involved in the 
decision making process and can be seen in the arguments made by the opponents of the 
DYEC.  
 
Loss of Trust: 
The public’s loss of trust is the second motivator behind incinerator opposition. 
There are two primary facets behind the public’s loss of trust. The first is distrust in 
governments and industry to effectively manage and control the waste disposal facility’s 
environmental impacts (Petts 1994). The public does not trust that private industry will 
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consider public safety and the environment as seriously as generating a profit (Petts 
1994). They also do not trust that governments are able to effectively monitor and 
enforce their own environmental protection regulations (Petts 1994). The second facet 
behind the public’s loss of trust comes from socially ingrained perceptions of the 
credibility of certain groups. Politicians and for-profit consulting firms are seen as 
significantly less credible than groups that do not have a stake in the project such as 
physicians or academics from local universities (Petts 1994). The public puts a lot of 
weight in where information came from before blindly accepting it as the truth. 
 
 There are many instances where one can point to a lack of trust in government and 
industry as motivation for the actions of the opposition movement. The opposition’s lack 
of trust in industry can be seen by their criticism of Covanta as the builder and operator 
of the project. Incinerator opponents spoke out about the company’s track record of 
exceeding emission allowances and multiple workplace safety violations. Further 
exploration of these criticisms can be found in the previous chapter of this paper. Another 
example of their lack of trust in industry can be seen by the DYEC opponents’ criticisms 
of the choice of consultant for the project. Durham and York Region hired the consulting 
firms ‘Jacques Whitford’ and ‘Genivar’ to undertake a study aimed at finding the best 
long-term solution to manage their waste locally (Bracken 2009b). Both of these firms 
are members of the Canadian Energy-From-Waste Coalition. The coalition’s mission 
statement states, “we stand for the promotion, adoption and implementation of energy-
from-waste technology for the management of residual materials” (Bracken 2009b). 
These firms ultimately recommended that a thermal treatment facility be used to manage 
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the Region’s waste. Incineration opponents argued that the selection of thermal treatment 
to manage the Regions’ waste was a foregone conclusion when the decision was made to 
hire these consultants (Bracken 2009b).  
 
 The opposition also showed distrust in government throughout the development 
process. The opposition’s distrust in government can be see through their response to a 
public statement made by Durham Region’s medical officer of health, Dr. Robert Kyle. 
Dr. Kyle stated that incinerator would, “not pose an unacceptable risk to persons living in 
the vicinity of the site” (Gilligan 2009). The public clearly did not trust this attempt to 
reassure them, as health concerns were the primary topic brought up at council meetings 
and PICs. While doctors are generally seen as having more credibility than politicians, 
the fact that the Region directly employed him diminished some of this credibility. On 
the other hand members of the public rallied behind a group of 47 Clarington physicians 
who unanimously approved and addressed a letter to the Ministry of the Environment, 
which condemned the construction of the incinerator in Clarington. The Nurse 
Practitioners Association of Ontario also endorsed this letter (Hatherly 2011). These 
medical professionals had more credibility in the public eye because they were not 
affiliated with the project. Another example of the opposition’s distrust can be seen from 
their response to the results of a 2008 phone survey asking residents whether or not they 
supported the development of an incinerator. The research company Ipsos Reid ran this 
survey (Hatherly 2011). They surveyed 200 Durham Region residents and found that 
77% of residents were in favour of building the incinerator (Hatherly 2011). Several 
residents reported that they did not believe the approval rating for the incinerator was as 
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high as the survey results suggested. Pam Callus, an incinerator opponent ran her own 
survey with the help of four other residents to verify the Ipsos Reid results. Callus said 
that her survey “was inspired by a lack of belief in the Ipsos Reid survey” (Hatherly 
2011). Callus’ survey found that only 38% of Clarington residents were in favour of the 
incinerator (Hatherly 2011). These are just a few examples that point to the distrust 
residents felt towards government and industry. Opinions and data from people 
associated with the project were seen as biased and those that came from outsiders were 
seen as credible.  
 
 This distrust in government was likely the result of the public’s past experiences 
with incinerators in the province. The Solid Waste Reduction Unit (SWARU) was a solid 
waste incinerator located in Hamilton, Ontario. SWARU opened in 1972 and operated 
until it was closed in 2002 (Carter-Whitney 2007). It burned approximately 40 to 60 
percent of Hamilton’s municipal solid waste. SWARU faced significant opposition from 
Hamilton residents starting from the late 1980s right until it was closed in 2002 (Carter-
Whitney 2007). Residents were concerned that the facility’s emissions such as dioxins, 
furans, and other toxins posed a significant health risk to those living in the community. 
(Carter-Whitney 2007) The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario reported that 
SWARU emitted approximately 5.5 grams of dioxins and furans (measured as ‘Toxic 
Equivalent Quotient’) in the year 2000. This amounted to 60 percent of the total dioxin 
and furan emissions from all municipal solid waste incinerators in Canada that year 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2002). SWARU was able to operate with these 
high levels of emissions because the facility’s original approval that had been issued by 
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Ontario’s Ministry of Environment and Energy in 1972 contained no restrictive 
conditions. (Carter-Whitney 2007) Community groups argued that the original approval 
did not meet modern environmental standards and should thus be repealed (Carter-
Whitney 2007). These arguments won the battle for the opponents and eventually led to 
the facility shutting down. It was decided that it was too costly to update the facility’s air 
pollution control systems so that they could meet the new Canada-wide standards (Carter-
Whitney 2007). Despite this victory, it took years of using public processes such as 
applications under the Environmental Bill of Rights to persuade the municipal and 
provincial governments to respond to their concerns. (Carter-Whitney 2007) The length 
and difficulty of getting the government to close down this clearly dangerous and 
outdated facility may explain one of the reasons why so many people tend to resist the 
development of incinerators. They know how difficult it will be to move the government 
into action if the facility does not meet up to its health and safety promises. Events like 
this break the trust that people have that the government is truly working for the public 
interest.  
 
Lack of Effective Communication: 
 The third motivator behind incinerator opposition according to Petts is a lack of 
effective communication (Petts 1994). Industrialists tend to claim that the NIMBY (Not 
In My Back Yard) syndrome arises when the public has “irrational” fears of threats to 
their health and safety that aren’t supported by any data (Petts 1994). If this were true 
then NIMBY opposition should be able to be mitigated simply by providing the public 
with more information about the safety of the facility. However, when researchers tested 
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this theory they found that people were actually more likely to exhibit NIMBY attitudes 
when they had more issue relevant (non-technical) information such as risk assessments 
(Petts 1994). This is because the results of risk assessments do not address the broad 
range of concerns held by the public (Petts 1994). The public is also interested in the 
technical aspects such as safety systems and operational details of the plant, a breakdown 
of the risks versus the benefits of using this technology, whether or not the facility is 
actually needed, and alternative waste management options (Petts 1994). Audrey Armour 
explains that when it comes to determining whether to approve or restrict a proposed 
project, citizen concerns about the potential risks and their views regarding what is 
acceptable often appear to be of little importance in the public policy debate (Armour 
1993). The views of experts are welcomed, and listened to even if they contradict one 
another, while the views of the people who will be exposed to the potential risks are 
denied legitimacy (Armour 1993). The system of risk assessment prevents a meaningful 
exchange of ideas and concerns and results in the marginalization of those who are most 
affected by the decisions (Armour 1993). 
 A lack of communication was not a major issue during the development approval 
process for the DYEC. All of the documents and reports for the project were made 
accessible to the public on the project website. This includes consultant reports such as, 
facility management plans, and environmental monitoring plans and reports. Complaint 
logs were also made available on the project website. These logs tracked every email and 
phone call made to York and Durham Regions that either complained or inquired about 
the DYEC. These logs allowed residents to read what complaints and inquiries had been 
made and follow up if they were dissatisfied by a response or lack there of. Logs of 
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comments made at public consultations and council meetings were also made available. 
The pubic was consulted prior to every stage of the project. They were consulted when 
the region decided to do a study on how to manage their residual waste. They were later 
invited to give input on which criteria should be used and prioritized when evaluating 
waste disposal technologies and potential sites. The public continued to be consulted at 
every milestone throughout the project. It is clear that a major effort was placed on 
ensuring there was sufficient public communication throughout this project.  
 While a lack of communication was not a problem during the project, Petts’ theory 
suggests that it is a lack of ‘effective’ communication that spurs community opposition. 
While the public had plenty of opportunity to voice their opinions on the project, it was 
not necessarily the case that their opinions were given much weight. Public suggestions 
were frequently rejected not because they were not valid but because of aversions to 
adding to the cost of the project. While money is a significant consideration, it seems like 
it was frequently prioritized over other considerations such as public health. Prohibitive 
costs seemed to be the catchall scapegoat to ignore public suggestions. For example, in 
the previous chapter I discussed the public’s criticism to a site being selected before the 
incineration technology. It was suggested that a technology be chosen first followed by a 
study on two potential sites in order to determine which would be more environmentally 
suitable for the facility. This suggestion was dismissed on the basis of cost. Another 
example, also found in the previous chapter is the public’s criticism that the Region voted 
not to use ambient air monitoring around the incinerator. In this instance the consultants 
did give a more sound explanation as to why they did not recommend the use of that 
technology beyond simply stating that it would be too costly. Despite this explanation 
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from the consultants, members of the public made it clear that they felt the technology 
was important for their safety. The Region ultimately decided to accept the consultant’s 
recommendations, while the public was left feeling that their concerns were not being 
addressed. Despite the Region’s claims that there was not enough money in the budget to 
implement these types of suggestions made by the public, they still managed to find the 
money to throw a $75,000 party to celebrate the groundbreaking of the facility. This type 
of extravagant spending only grew the public’s distrust.   
Problems in the Decision Making Process: 
 The last factor leading to public opposition according to Petts are problems in the 
decision making process. Facility siting often follows the “decide-announce-defend” 
model, in which the public is only engaged after key decisions about the project have 
already been made (Ducsik 1981). Key decisions such as choosing the type of process 
and technology that will be used, site selection, as well as fundamental policy issues such 
as acceptable environmental and health standards (Petts 1994). Not only is the public 
excluded from participating in these key waste management decisions, those decisions 
are also being made by groups who they do not trust (Petts 1994). Miraftab argues that 
public participation processes create illusions of equality and the redistribution of 
decision-making power, when in reality it constrains what people can debate, how they 
do it, where they can do it, and when (Miraftab, 2004). 
 While the public had plenty of opportunity to comment before any formal decisions 
had been made, nothing they said seemed to affect the outcomes of the process. The 
decision makers made it clear how much they valued or rather did not value all the 
negative feedback they were receiving at council meetings. This was seen when Durham 
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Regional Council passed a motion that reduced the amount of time delegates were 
allowed to talk at council meetings and limited how often they could address council on a 
single topic. This event, which was discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter, 
reduced the public’s opportunity to get involved in major decisions, which in turn 
minimized the effectiveness of the decision making process. Another flaw in the decision 
making process of the DYEC was the fact that the municipality’s willingness to be a host 
for the facility was only a consideration to the final decision. Taking the position that 
they were an unwilling host would not have prevented the development of the facility. A 
motion was passed to change this at Durham Regional Council but the motion failed with 
only 3 out of the 28 councillors voting in favour of it. This motion would have put 
incinerators in line with the regulations for landfill development, which requires a willing 
host. With this major imbalance of power in the decision making process it is clear why 
the public felt the need to form rallies to protest the facility. Engaging with decision 
makers through the formal channels would have no bearing on the final outcome of the 
facility.     
 In this chapter I looked at Judith Petts’ theory on the motivating factors behind 
incineration opposition. These factors are perceptions of risk, lack of trust, ineffective 
communication, and problems with the decision making process. After analyzing the 
arguments made by the DYEC opponents it is clear that these were in fact the motivators 
behind their actions. In the next chapter I will be looking at community engagement 
theory in order to find out how the engagement process could have been improved. 
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Chapter 6 - Community Engagement Theory: 
In this chapter I will be looking at the community communications plan for the 
DYEC. I will first give an overview of the plan. I will discuss the planning theory that 
has inspired modern community engagement practices. This will be followed with an 
explanation of collaborative IAs and their use in the DYEC community communications 
plan. I will discuss the problems with modern community engagement practices. Finally, 
I will address the most prominent solution discussed in planning theory, which are 
democratic IAs with voluntary facility siting.  
 
Overview of the DYEC Community Communications Plan: 
In Ontario, project proponents are required to create a community communication 
plan as a condition of environmental assessment approval. These plans must include 
details on how information concerning the infrastructure development will be 
disseminated to interested members of the public. This information includes reports and 
records that were required to obtain project approval, details on the activities involved in 
the project, as well as information on the complaint protocols for the development. They 
must detail when public meetings will be held to discuss the design, construction, and 
operation of the project (The Regional Municipalities of Durham and York 2012). 
Community communications plans must also include a breakdown of the objectives it 
aims to achieve through the engagement process. The objectives of the DYEC 
Community Communications Plan are to convey that the two regions are dedicated to 
ensuring the safety and protection of human and environmental health; that they will 
continue to encourage and enhance waste diversion and recycling programs; that they are 
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dedicated to presenting factual information and engaging with the public and Aboriginal 
communities about the facility (The Regional Municipalities of Durham and York 2012). 
 
In order to monitor the effectiveness of the plan the Region tracked all inquiries, 
comments, and complaints it received regarding the project. The areas of the project that 
were found to have received the most attention were reviewed periodically prior to 
construction of the facility in order to determine if there was a need to implement 
mitigation measures. Monthly complaint logs were posted to the project website detailing 
all of the complaints and inquiries related to the incinerator. (The Regional Municipalities 
of Durham and York, 2012) This was done to increase the Region’s accountability by 
allowing the public to see what concerns had been voiced and to check on whether or not 
the Region had followed up on them. 
 
Planning Theory That Inspired Modern Community Engagement Practices: 
The use of ‘environmental impact assessments’ (EIA) in infrastructure 
development proposals is a product of rational comprehensive planning. Rational 
comprehensive planning, which is grounded in scientific rationalist theory, involves 
identifying a need, devising multiple solutions, using objective data to determine the most 
effective solution, and consulting with the public about the project (Healey 1992). These 
factors are all reflected in the required components of the EIA. The grounding in 
scientific rationalist theory has resulted in EIAs favouring quantitative methods and 
feedback loops to justify plans but the integration of public consultation shows a 
departure from purely scientific decision-making (Healey 1992).  
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 Scientific rationalism was originally conceived as a progressive and democratic 
way to plan cities. The idea was that human happiness and welfare could be maximized 
by rationally making decisions using scientific knowledge (Healey 1992). Unfortunately, 
instead of being utilized for utilitarian purposes, scientific rationalism was used to justify 
putting the needs of capital before those of citizens or the environment (Healey 1992). 
For example, economic criteria were used to justify the development of large road 
projects. These projects were designed specifically to benefit industrial companies and 
those working in them but were not functional for other groups such the elderly, and 
disabled (Healey 1992). All decisions on how cities should be designed and therefore 
how people should live were made by groups of predominantly white middle class men 
who were considered “experts” (Rahder and Milgrom 2004). The people who the space 
was being developed for were not given an opportunity to contribute their voices to the 
discussion on how or what would be developed (Rahder and Milgrom 2004). These 
voices are often coloured by values and ways of knowing that are significantly different 
from those of the “experts” (Rahder and Milgrom 2004). For example, some groups may 
prefer to use moral or aesthetic discourses when deciding how to develop certain spaces 
instead of discourses surrounding maximizing capital. By excluding these voices, experts 
are failing to utilize a vast amount of knowledge from the decision making process 
(Rahder and Milgrom 2004).   
 
 The departure from pure scientific rationalism came about through the recognition 
that cities are comprised of complex interconnected systems (Webber 1963). One change 
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to a policy or a physical landscape, as would happen through the development of a large 
waste disposal facility, can potentially cause a domino effect of changes to the social, 
psychological, economic, and political environments in which it is placed (Webber 1963). 
These changes can have lasting influences on the welfare of the people who live there. 
With so many interconnected factors involved, comprehensive theorists understood that it 
would be impossible to gather perfect information on all possible effects of each 
development option (Webber 1963). On top of that, the groups and individuals that make 
up the general public tend to have competing interests. No plan could satisfy everyone 
and not many people are willing to make sacrifices for the public good (Webber 1963). 
This puts decision makers in a tough situation where they are asked to prioritize the 
interests of certain groups over others. In order to minimize social backlash, planners 
started being more open to the public about what was being considered in the decision 
making process and why (Webber 1963). This removed the veil of secrecy that had 
surrounded town planning. This openness also had the effect of making decision makers 
more accountable to the general public thus reducing the potential for corruption (Webber 
1963). Additionally, planners started inviting the public to participate in forums that 
would give them an opportunity to voice their opinions regarding new developments 
(Webber 1963). In doing this planners were able to learn what social consequences the 
general public felt would arise as a result of certain decisions. (Webber 1963) The 
information received from public consultations could be used to adjust plans and provide 
decision makers with a means of justifying the approval of contentious developments 
(Webber 1963).  
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 These inclusionary ideas were derived from communicative planning theory. On 
the contrary to scientific rationalism’s expert driven approach to planning, 
communicative planning theory advocates building consensus between stakeholders 
(Watson 2002). Planners are charged with facilitating a forum that allows for the different 
groups to communicate their ideas to one another, put forward arguments in favour of 
their causes, and debate issues with the end goal of reaching consensus on a course of 
action. (Watson 2002) Communicative theorists argue that the planners should primarily 
be concerned with ensuring that the planning process is just and inclusive (Watson 2002). 
They claim that if the planning process is just, then the outcome of that process will be as 
well. 
 
 Communicative planning does not reject the use of reason. On the contrary, it 
claims that reason is necessary in order for people to sympathize with perspectives other 
than their own (Healey 1992). Unlike scientific rationalism that has a subject-object 
conception of reason (where individuals reason from their personal perspectives), 
Habermas argues that we need to shift our perspectives and instead form our reasoning 
within inter-subjective communication (Healey 1992). Doing this involves utilizing all 
the ways we come to acquire knowledge when choosing our actions, not just pure logic 
and knowledge that can be empirically gathered scientifically (Healey 1992). Ideas are 
validated through discursively established principles, which may be the same as those 
found in scientific rationalism, but is not necessarily the case (Healey 1992). It is those 
who participate in the dialogue who ultimately decide what information and types of 
knowledge should be considered relevant for the particular situation, and what actions 
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should be put forward in response (Healey 1992). In addition to this, Habermas stipulates 
that all claims must be assessed in terms of their, “comprehensibility, integrity, 
legitimacy, and truth” (Healey 1992). Agreements made as a result of argumentation in 
one situation at a particular time cannot automatically be applied to another at a different 
time. Claims must be re-validated and re-assessed and agreements revised. This is to 
avoid having the process of collective argumentation fall into a potentially dominatory 
consensus (Healey 1992). 
 
Proponents of public participation report that it has a wide range of benefits to 
both the project itself and the host community as a whole. The inclusion of the voices 
from outside the project’s team provides project managers more ideas to learn from, 
which can improve the design of the development (Lawrence 2013). It ensures that the 
EIA has a significant focus on stakeholder issues, which helps mitigate 
miscommunication and conflict between the public and the development team (Lawrence 
2013). This in turn increases the public’s support and acceptance of the project, which 
has the follow-up consequence of increasing the project’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
regulators who have approval authority (Lawrence 2013). The inclusion of public 
participation also makes the decision making process more transparent and thus less 
susceptible to lobbying by vested interest groups (Lawrence 2013). 
 
The Use of Collaborative IAs in the DYEC: 
 The Durham York Energy Centre Community Engagement Plan was developed 
using a collaborative impact assessment process. This process was highly influenced by 
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communicative planning theory. Collaborative IA makes the public an active an ongoing 
participant in the development process. Its goal is to ensure that the public is provided 
information throughout the project and given a forum to voice their comments and 
concerns (Lawrence 2013). Collaborative IAs try to get the public involved early in the 
project as well as to get them involved in aspects of the project approval process that they 
have been traditionally left out of (Lawrence 2013). These aspects include IA screenings, 
scoping, and post approval decisions. Public concerns and comments are posted and 
responded to publicly, which in turn makes the project proponents more accountable and 
demonstrates to the public the impact they have had on the decision making process 
(Lawrence 2013). In addition to voicing their concerns, collaborative IAs give the public 
a forum to share their values, perspectives, and preferences with decision makers before 
final decisions are made (O’Faircheallaigh 2010). The public tends to understand the 
environmental and social conditions of their own communities better than outside 
consultants. This gives them greater insight into the potential impacts a new facility 
would have in their community and thus make them a great source of information for 
project proponents (O’Faircheallaigh 2010). Utilizing this type of high quality 
information in decision-making results in better and more effective decisions.     
 
 There are 5 main elements that make up collaborative IAs. Those elements are 
consultation, communications, mutual education, negotiations, and collaboration 
(Lawrence 2013). Consultation involves informing the public about project proposals and 
giving them the opportunity to express their views before any decisions are made 
(Lawrence 2013). Communications refers to the approach undertaken to reach out to 
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communities. For collaborative IAs the approach is one that advocates for capacity 
building and outreach. This is done by allowing the public to participate in a variety of 
ways to make it as easy as possible for them to get involved (Lawrence 2013). This 
generally means utilizing online forums as well as community meetings (Lawrence 
2013). Communications also involve using several different forms of media to inform the 
public about current issues and involvement opportunities. Newspapers, radio, and online 
social media are potential options for reaching out to the public (Lawrence 2013).  
 
 Mutual education is an approach to community engagement where the proponents 
both educate and are educated by the public. The proponents educate the public on the 
regulatory and scientific aspects of a proposal and the public educates them with personal 
experimental knowledge (Lawrence 2013). Both forms of knowledge are given equal 
weight in the decision making process. Negotiations in collaborative IA practice can 
either be aided or unaided. If they are aided they will either utilize court litigation or they 
will use a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) (Lawrence 2013). ADR is a 
negotiation system where stakeholders voluntarily work together to find mutually 
acceptable solutions. Its goal is to resolve conflicts without resorting to litigation 
(Lawrence 2013). Opponents of a facility tend to want to avoid litigation because it is 
very costly and is often ineffective at helping them achieve their goals. Neutral mediators 
are usually used to assist parties in finding acceptable solutions but final decision making 
authority remains unchanged (Lawrence 2013). Finally, collaboration is something that is 
utilized throughout the entire process in order to find the best solutions that work for 
everyone (Lawrence 2013). One of the key facets of collaboration is the use of working 
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groups that brings members from all interested stakeholder groups together to resolve 
problems before, during, and after the development of the project (Lawrence 2013).   
 
A collaborative IA process that is done properly will result in all stakeholders 
accepting the final outcome but not entirely happily (Lawrence 2013). It aims to find the 
middle ground that works for the majority, not one group or another. For example, 
project proponents would likely be happy that their proposal was approved but unhappy 
that they are being required to implement what they would consider to be rigorous and 
demanding environmental protection measures. Similarly, environmental groups would 
likely be happy that many of their concerns had been listened and responded to but feel 
like the final mitigation measures were still not entirely sufficient (Morrison-Saunders 
2013).   
 
Problems With Current Community Engagement Practices:  
 While it is widely acknowledged that public participation has many benefits some 
theorists believe that it is not being used to empower the public. Miraftab argues that the 
participatory processes put forward by comprehensive rationalism are ultimately used to 
push forward anti-democratic agendas (Miraftab 2004). The public consultation process 
only offers a very limited type of public participation. It reduces discussions surrounding 
empowerment to nothing more than conversations about increasing access to resources 
and economic gains for individuals (Miraftab 2004). It does not create a space for people 
to challenge the status quo and question the oppressive systemic structures that have 
played a large role in forming their current social and economic situations (Miraftab 
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2004). Public participation processes create illusions of equality and that power is being 
redistributed, when in reality it constrains what people can debate, how they do it, where 
they can do it, and when (Miraftab 2004). This effectively depoliticizes the public’s 
understanding of how to become politically engaged (Miraftab 2004). It stabilizes old 
social hierarchies by solely focusing on individual empowerment thereby shifting 
attention away from systemically ingrained inequalities in the status quo (Miraftab 2004).  
 
Critics of traditional community engagement practices argue that the fact that 
grassroots movements continue to emerge and fight for change despite the existence of 
sanctioned forums where they can voice their opinions makes it clear that this form of 
engagement is inadequate (Miraftab 2004). These critics would argue that the failure of 
this type of participatory process could be seen in the public’s reaction to the proposed 
incinerator in Clarington. Various grassroots movements formed to protest the 
development of the Durham York Energy Centre. These groups formed picket lines, ran 
surveys to test whether the government’s public approval statistics were valid, and 
gathered information about incinerator safety as they did not trust the information 
provided by the government (Gilligan 2011b). Critics would argue that had the public 
participation been successful people would not have felt the need to form opposition 
groups and become engaged outside of the sanctioned spaces. 
 
Correcting Power Imbalances With Democratic IAs: 
 Power imbalances can be corrected by focusing IA practices on the analysis and 
management of community conflict. Rahder and Milgrom explain that overcoming 
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systemic biases requires replacing the concept of liberal justice with the concept of 
redistributive justice (Rahder and Milgrom 2004). Liberal justice essentially advocates 
helping those in need so long as it does not impact the rights or living conditions of those 
who are better off. Redistributive justice on the other hand threatens to shake up the 
status quo by removing capitalistic assumptions from the decision making process that 
give priority to certain groups’ interests over others (i.e. homeowners having a greater 
stake in planning issues than tenants, who have a greater stake than the homeless) 
(Rahder and Milgrom 2004). It calls for the elimination of all hierarchical distinctions, 
such as that of professional and user (Rahder and Milgrom 2004). Within every 
community there are many people who have different needs and values that compete with 
one another. It is not the planner’s role to judge whose needs should be prioritized or to 
decide on which option would best meet the needs of the community (Rahder and 
Milgrom 2004). Rahder and Milgrom argue that, “It is up to the planner to clarify and 
acknowledge the implications for different groups of people, and to help politicize the 
process”. (Rahder and Milgrom 2004) This is not to say that planners should be impartial. 
On the contrary they should use their position as advisors to advocate for the 
disadvantaged in order to close the ever-increasing gap in social equality and promote 
social justice (Rahder and Milgrom 2004). All community members should have the 
opportunity to actively participate in the planning and design process. This is opposed to 
being relegated to commenting on the designs and plans created by professionals. 
Marginalized groups are more likely to get involved in political and social life when they 
actually see changes occurring within the city as a result of their contributions.     
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 Democratic IAs aim to fix the power imbalances found in traditional IAs. 
Democratic IA processes are designed with the goal of building public confidence, trust, 
and acceptance of a project by increasing the public’s influence and control over major 
decisions that directly affect them (Lawrence 2013). This process aims to give the public 
influence and control over not only the final decision but also the formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation as well (Lawrence 2013). Proponents of democratic IA 
believe that all citizens should have the opportunity to participate in and be equally 
influential in decision-making. If there are power imbalances that make a group less 
influential than another, it is the responsibility of those in power to correct that imbalance 
(Lawrence 2013).  
 
 In a democratic IA, members of the public who are most directly impacted by the 
proposed project and the locally elected politicians lead the IA process (Todd 2002). 
Alternatively, a team of ordinary citizens can lead the project without the active 
participation of politicians. They would act under the assumption that that they would 
likely receive political support if they manage to achieve broad public agreement on the 
plan they devised (Todd 2002). These teams work with the various stakeholders involved 
in the project to jointly solve problems, control the process, and reach decisions. IA 
practitioners collaborate with the lead team and other stakeholders and act as facilitators 
(Armour 1990). Committees and workshops are used throughout the entire duration of 
the project in order to reach and retain consensus as well as maintain contact and support 
from the broader constituencies (Lawrence 2013).   
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The first step when beginning a democratic IA process it to establish a task force 
comprised of affected stakeholders who would volunteer to manage the IA (Lawrence 
2013). Once established the task force would begin the process by identifying the key 
values and principles they want to use to guide their recommendations. If members of the 
task force have highly divergent ideologies they would split up into two separate groups 
that would devise recommendations independently from each other (Lawrence 2013). 
They would then identify the major issues at hand, the available choices for managing the 
problem, and formulate strategies on how to best facilitate public and agency 
participation (Lawrence 2013). The task force will utilize the knowledge provided by the 
public and relevant agencies to develop a proposed action for the problem as well as a list 
of alternatives (Lawrence 2013).  
 
 Any proposed facility would be sited using a voluntary siting approach. Voluntary 
siting is a five-step process (Munton 1996). Any interested municipality has the right to 
back out of the process at any time. The first step involves putting out an open invitation 
to municipalities within a region to become a host community for the facility (Munton 
1996). In order to volunteer a city council would need to pass a resolution of interest to 
host the facility. Proponents of the facility do detailed assessments on the soil, hydrology, 
and terrain within the volunteer communities to determine which sites are ecologically 
suitable for the project (Munton 1996). Many municipalities initially volunteer for the 
sole purpose of having these assessments done because the project proponent takes on the 
cost. They have no obligation to proceed further as site hosts, and the resulting 
documents are useful for local needs such as for zoning purposes (Munton 1996). The 
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second step is to form local advisory committees who are tasked with hosting open 
houses that would give the public a forum to ask questions about the facility and any 
potential risks (Munton 1996). A showing of strong opposition from the community could 
motivate local councils to rescind their initial expression of interest in hosting the project. 
Strong community opposition may also lead to the siting task force unilaterally deciding 
to drop the community from the facility siting process (Munton 1996). The third step 
involves the recommendation from the local advisory committee (Munton 1996). If the 
advisory committee gives a negative report then their community would be removed from 
the list of potential host cities (Munton 1996). The fourth step is to run a referendum 
within the eligible communities in order to concretely determine the public’s support 
(Munton 1996). A negative vote in the referendum equates a local veto for the project. 
The final step in the process is to negotiate the terms of the siting (Munton 1996). The 
community’s concerns and preferences provide the basis for these terms, which include 
risk mitigation, local benefits, and compensation policies and measures. Commitment to 
individuals and communities are formalized in accords and agreements (Lawrence 2013). 
The community even has an opportunity to back out at this late stage if they are not able 
to come to an agreement with the proponent on these terms (Munton 1996).     
 
 Once a site has been selected using a voluntary siting process the democratic IA 
continues with the evaluation of facility design options, facility operations plans, as well 
as facility closure and post-closure options (Lawrence 2013). The evaluation is done 
using traditional impact analysis techniques. If multiple task forces were formed, it is at 
this point that they come together with their findings and work to reconcile their 
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differences (Lawrence 2013). Once resolved the public task force then puts together an 
overall impact management strategy. This strategy is devised using an extensive 
knowledge base including technical studies, applied research, visits to comparable 
facilities as well as community and traditional knowledge (Lawrence 2013). The task 
force works on an ongoing basis to include perspective, interests, and preferences of the 
overall public (Lawrence 2013). The IA process proceeds to approval only when there is 
clear community acceptance. The approval process is determined with the aid of public 
participation (Lawrence 2013). The ample amount of collaboration throughout the project 
with the public should assure that the final proposal is widely accepted. In the situation 
that this is not the case, an appeal procedure to an independent review body will be made 
available for people to contest the facility (Lawrence 2013).   
Analysis	  of	  Democratic	  IAs:	  
 Democratic IAs have the potential to relieve all the motivators that drive public 
opposition. They are able to rebuild the public’s lost trust in government through the 
redistribution of power. Building trust has the simultaneous effect of reducing the 
public’s risk perceptions on incinerators. This is because they are more likely to accept 
reassurances from the government about the facility’s safety. Democratic IAs ensure 
effective communication by making all voices in public discussions equal. This is 
opposed to the current system, where the opinions of “experts” or government officials 
are prioritized over those from the public. Democratic IAs will also improve the current 
decision making system by making major decisions, as the name suggests, more 
democratic.   
 One concern with the use of democratic IAs is the use of voluntary site selection. 
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While being voluntary makes the process seem more equitable than traditional practices, 
it is likely to put an even greater burden on the most disadvantaged communities. 
Affluent communities are unlikely to be tempted by the benefits and compensation 
awarded to host cities. The poorest communities on the other hand would see a major 
benefit from the compensation packages and volunteer primarily as a result of economic 
need. This would result in undesirable facilities that pose a known health risk (regardless 
of how big or small) such as incinerators and landfills being frequently sited near the 
most disadvantaged groups. While this is a valid concern, in practice it is not inevitability. 
Voluntary siting was used to site a hazardous waste facility near Swan Hills, Alberta in 
1982 (Baxter 2007). Swan Hills was not a disadvantaged or vulnerable bargaining 
position when they passed the referendum to allow the siting of the facility. A study was 
done on the community 15 years after the development of the facility that found the 
residents of Swan Hills were still in favour of being the host for the facility (Baxter 
2007). 
 In this chapter I looked at the community communications plan for the DYEC. I 
gave an overview of the plan and discussed the planning theory that has inspired modern 
community engagement practices. This was followed by an explanation of collaborative 
IAs and their use in the DYEC community communications plan. I proceeded to about 
the problems with modern community engagement practices. I concluded with a 
discussion on democratic IAs and voluntary facility siting. 
 In the next chapter I will be concluding the paper with a summary and some final 
thoughts about the lessons learned from this paper. 	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Chapter 7 – Conclusion: 
Summary:	  
 This paper focused on the development approval process for the DYEC in order to 
understand how communities are currently being engaged in Ontario for the development 
of incinerators. It was seen that communities are consulted at every stage of the project 
before any approvals have been given. Community members were invited to give input 
on their preferred waste management solution, the criteria that should be prioritized when 
deciding what technology or site to use, and were given the opportunity to respond to the 
consultant’s recommendations and speak before council before any decisions were voted 
on. Despite all of the consultation, the development of the DYEC still faced a significant 
amount of controversy and opposition. This was mainly the result of problems in the 
decision making process. Despite the quantity of consultation, the public’s opinions had 
no impact on the final decisions made by the Region. The decision to go ahead with the 
incinerator was not even deterred by a motion by Clarington Municipal Council to take 
the position that the city would be an unwilling host. The public’s feeling that they were 
not being listened to made the public consultations ineffective and reduced the public’s 
trust in the regulators. The goal of the public consultation was ultimately to alleviate the 
public’s preconceived perceptions that incinerators pose a significant risk to human and 
environmental health. Doing this would have increased the public approval for the 
project. The consultations failed to achieve this goal because the public did not trust the 
government to listen to them or act in their best interest.  
 
 A viable solution to the above mentioned problems could be found in democratic 
	   99	  
impact assessment theory. Democratic IAs aim to correct power imbalances in the 
decision making process by giving ordinary citizens the opportunity to take the lead on 
projects. Task forces work with communities, regulators and consultants in order to find 
an optimal solution to communal problems. It is the task force that puts forward the final 
recommendations to decision makers, not the “experts” (Lawrence 2013). Once a 
solution has been decided on, communities that are ecologically suitable for the project 
are then asked to volunteer to be a host. Citizens are then given the opportunity to vote on 
whether or not they want to go ahead with the development (Munton 1996). This process 
gives communities significantly more power than they currently have, which in turn will 
legitimize the process and produce general acceptance of the final decision.    
 Incineration can be a valuable part of a municipality’s waste management solution 
so long as robust recycling and composting programs accompany it. The majority of 
dangerous incinerator emissions come from the products it burns. Proper sorting of the 
incinerator’s feed can significantly increase the safety of the facility and ensure that 
valuable materials that can be recycled are preserved. As of September 2016, Durham 
Region’s manager of waste planning and technical services, Gioseph Annello, announced 
that the Region was looking into developing a mechanical and biological treatment 
facility to sort recyclables and organics out of the waste stream heading to the DYEC 
(McNaughton 2016e). If developed this facility would be used to compliment the existing 
curbside collection programs the Region runs for recyclables and organics. It will add an 
extra level of protection to ensure the feed going into the incinerator is as safe as 
possible.    
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Final Thoughts: 
I started this project trying to find out how to mitigate community opposition to 
contentious facilities. I now realize that is not a realistic goal. No amount of consultation 
will convince people to approve of something they do not want, especially when they feel 
that it is being forced on them. The goal of community communications plans should not 
be mitigating opposition but rather should be engaging communities to find optimal 
strategies for handling communal problems such as waste management or energy. When 
people trust a process and believe that they have a say in decisions they are less likely to 
oppose the outcome. A good example of this would be a political election. While it is 
unlikely that everyone will be satisfied with the final result, people usually accept it 
because they trust the process that brought them there. The encouragement the public 
receives to get involved in politics during election season and the power they have to 
effect outcomes needs to be ever present in public decision-making processes, especially 
for decisions on things that are generally seen as being undesirable.	  	  	   	  
	   101	  
Works Cited:  





Anderson, Richard. 1997. “Waste Disposal in Toronto’s Past” in Nicholas Eyles (ed.) 
(1997) Environmental Geology of Urban Areas (Geological Association of Canada 
GeoText3) pp. 323-330. 
 
Argyris, Eileen. 2015. “No Incinerator For Port Hope”. Northumberland Today. 
http://www.northumberlandtoday.com/2015/03/17/no-incinerator-for-port-hope 
 
Armour, A. 1990. “Socially Responsible Facility Siting, Doctoral Dissertation”. 
University of Waterloo. Waterloo, ON.  
 
Armour, A. 1993. “Risk Assessment in Environmental Policymaking. Review Of Policy 
Research”, 12(3-4), 178-196. doi:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1993.tb00559.x  
Baxter, Jamie. 2007.  “Reassessing the Voluntary Facility Siting Process For a Hazardous 
Waste Facility in Alberta, Canada 15 Years Later”. University of Western Ontario. 
London, ON. 
Bracken, Wendy. 2009. “Advisory - Durham Residents Incinerator Information Session” 
Zero Waste 4 Zero Burning. http://www.zerowaste4zeroburning.ca/node/86 
Bracken, Wendy. 2009b. “Backgrounder for Wed Feb 11 Event” Zero Waste 4 Zero 
Burning. http://www.zerowaste4zeroburning.ca/node/87 
Carter-Whitney, Maureen. 2007. Ontario's Waste Management Challenge. Toronto, Ont.: 
Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy = L'institut canadien du droit et de 
la politique de l'environnement. 
 
Committee of the Whole Environmental Services. 2015. “2014 Annual Diversion Report 
And SM4RT Living Integrated Waste Management Master Plan Update”. Newmarket: 
York Region. 
 
Cruickshank, Tom. 2015. “A Burning Issue In Port Hope”. Watershed Magazine. 
http://watershedmagazine.com/index.php/a-burning-issue-in-port-hope 
Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs. 2012. “Mechanical Biological 
Treatment Of Municipal Solid Waste”. London: United Kingdom Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs. 
 
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs. 2013. “Advanced Thermal 
Treatment Of Municipal Solid Waste”. London: United Kingdom Department for 
	   102	  
Environment Food & Rural Affairs. 
 
Ducsik, D. (1981). Citizen Participation in Power Plant Siting Aladdin's Lamp or 
Pandora's Box?. Journal Of The American Planning Association, 47(2), 154-166. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944368108977100 
DurhamClear. 2010. “Why We Oppose Incineration”. Durham Citizens Lobby for 
Environmental Awareness & Responsibility. http://durhamclear.ca/incineration 
Durham Environment Watch. 2010. “Incineration: Not Safe, Not Sensible – The Facts 
and Issues in Brief. http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/incineration.htm  
Editorial. 2009. “Covanta Deal Stinky” Orono Weekly Times. 
http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Letters%2009/OWTJuly8CovantaDealStinkyE
D.pdf 
Editorial. 2016. “Blacking Out the Truth”. The Oshawa Express. 
http://oshawaexpress.ca/blacking-out-the-truth/ 
Environmental Commisioner of Ontario. 2002. “2001/2002 Annual Report: Developing 
Sustainability”. Toronto: Government of Ontario. 
 
Eyles, N., Boyce, J. & Hibbert, J. 1992. “The Geology of Garbage in Southern Ontario”. 
Geoscience Canada 12 (2), 50-62. 
Follert, Jillian. 2011. “Want to Speak at Durham Council? Make It Quick”. Oshawa This 
Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3500704-want-to-speak-at-durham-
council-make-it-quick/ 
Follert, Jillian. 2012. “DurhamCLEAR Ready to Bounce Back After Scrapping 
Incinerator Lawsuit”. Oshawa This Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-
story/3507146-durhamclear-ready-to-bounce-back-after-scrapping-incinerator-lawsuit/ 
Funston, Mike. 2009. “Durham Okays Incinerator Firm Despite Fears” The Toronto Star. 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2009/06/26/durham_okays_incinerator_firm_despite_f
ears.html 
Gasser, Linda. 2009. “Say No to Incineration in Canada”. Prevent Cancer Now. 
http://www.preventcancernow.ca/say-no-to-incineration-in-canada   
Gasser, Linda. 2009b. “Release - Durham Politicians Vote Against EFW Ambient Air 
Monitoring”. Zero Waste 4 Zero Burning. http://www.zerowaste4zeroburning.ca/node/89 
Gilligan, Keith. 2006. “Durham OK’s Thermal Waste Treatment System”. Oshawa This 
Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3497378-durham-ok-s-thermal-waste-
treatment-system/ 
Gilligan, Keith. 2009. “Clarington Local Reps Fire One Last Volley of Opposition to 
	   103	  
Incineration”. Oshawa This Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3467083-
clarington-local-reps-fire-one-last-volley-of-opposition-to-incineration/ 
Gilligan, Keith. 2009b. “Protestors Take to Streets Against Incinerator”. Oshawa This 
Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3468013-protestors-take-to-streets-
against-incinerator/ 
Gilligan, Keith. 2009c. “Group Protests Change in Clarington Incinerator Stance”. 
Oshawa This Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3468307-group-protests-
change-in-clarington-incinerator-stance/ 
Gilligan, Keith. 2011. “Anderson Apologizes For Incinerator Groundbreaking Party 
Cost”. Oshawa This Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3500175-
anderson-apologizes-for-incinerator-groundbreaking-party-cost/ 




Gilligan, Keith. 2016. “Residents Critical of Durham Incinerator as One Boiler Still 
Offline at Courtice Facility”. Clarington This Week. 
http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/6758988-residents-critical-of-durham-
incinerator-as-one-boiler-still-offline-at-courtice-facility/  
Hatfield, Erin. 2007. “Energy-From-Waste Meetings Draw Hundreds”. Clarington This 
Week. http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Media/050407Energy-from-
waste%20meetings%20draw%20hundreds.pdf  
Hatherly, Tara. 2011. “Claringotn Incinerator Set to Emit More Pollutants Than 
Originally Thought”. Oshawa This Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-
story/3451854-clarington-incinerator-set-to-emit-more-pollutants-than-originally-
thought/  
Healey, Patsy.  1992.  Planning through debate: The communicative turn in planning 
theory. Town Planning Review.  63(2): 143-162. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40113141origin=JSTOR-pdf 
 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). 2016. “Agents Classified by the 
IARC Monographs, Volumes 1 – 117”. World Health Organization. 
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/index.php    
Jacques Whitford. 2007. “Generic Risk Assessment Study”. The Regional Municipalities 
of Durham and York. 
https://www.durhamyorkwaste.ca/Archive/pdfs/study/processing/Residual%20Waste%20
Study%20-%20Generic%20Risk%20Assessment_Exec%20Summary.pdf  
Jacques Whitford. 2007b. “Thermal Treatment Facility Site Selection Process”. The 
Regional Municipalities of Durham and York. 
	   104	  
https://www.durhamyorkwaste.ca/Archive/pdfs/study/consultants/Preferred%20Site%20
Report.pdf 
Javed, Noor. 2015. “Peel to Build $500-Million Incinerator” The Toronto Star. 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/02/18/peel-to-build-500-million-incinerator.html 
Javed, Noor. 2016. “Peel Says No To Garbage Incineration”. Brampton Guardian. 
http://www.bramptonguardian.com/news-story/6220381-peel-says-no-to-garbage-
incineration/  
LaGro, James A. 2008. “Site Analysis”. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. 
Liebregts, Jason. 2008. “Protesters Brave the Cold to Say No to Incineration”. Metroland 
News. http://m.durhamregion.com/news-story/3481454-protesters-brave-the-cold-to-say-
no-to-incineration 
Lawrence, David P. 2013. Impact Assessment: Practical Solutions To Recurrent 
Problems And Contempora. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
MacViro Consultants Inc., 2005. “Background Document 2-2 Consideration of 
“Alternatives To” the Undertaking”. Markham: The Regional Municipalities of Durham 
and York. 
 
MacViro Consultants Inc., 2006. “Report On Evaluation Of “Alternatives To” And 
Identification Of Preferred Long-Term Residuals Processing System Recommendations”. 
Markham: The Regional Municipalities of Durham and York.  
 
MacViro Consultants Inc. 2007. “Identification and Evaluation of Sites Resulting in the 
Consultants Conclusion on the “Short-List” of Sites”. The Regional Municipalities of 
Durham and York. https://www.durhamyorkwaste.ca/Archive/pdfs/jwmg/JWMG-
Presentation-Mar-27-07-Agenda-Item-4-7-%20Final.pdf  
 
McGuinness, E. 2008. “Hamilton Poised to Scrap Incinerator Plan”. Hamilton Spectator. 
http://www.thespec.com/news-story/2107597-hamilton-poised-to-scrap-incinerator-plan/  
McNaughton, Graeme. 2016. “Investigation Into Pair of Incinerate Meetings Complete”. 
The Oshawa Express. http://oshawaexpress.ca/investigation-into-pair-of-incinerator-
meetings-complete/  
 
McNaughton, Graeme. 2016b. “Secret Incinerator Documents Released”. The Oshawa 
Express. http://oshawaexpress.ca/secret-incinerator-documents-released/ 
McNaughton, Graeme. 2016c. “Incinerator Exceeds Dioxin and Furan Limits Again”. 
The Oshawa Express. http://oshawaexpress.ca/incinerator-exceeds-dioxin-and-furan-
limits-again/  
 
McNaughton, Graeme. 2016d. “Incinerator Plan Gets Green Light”. The Oshawa 
Express. http://oshawaexpress.ca/incinerator-plan-gets-green-light/ 
	   105	  
McNaughton, Graeme. 2016e. “Anaerobic Digester Project One Step Closer”. The 
Oshawa Express. http://oshawaexpress.ca/anaerobic-digester-project-one-step-closer/  
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MOECC). 2015. “Ontario 




Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MOECC). 2016. “Ontario Passed New 
Waste-Free Ontario Act”. Ontario. https://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2016/06/ontario-passes-
new-waste-free-ontario-act.html  
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MOECC). 2016b. “Draft Strategy for 
a Waste Free Ontario: Building The Circular Economy”. Ontario. 
http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2015/012-
5834_DraftStrategy.pdf  
Miraftab, Faranak. (2004) Making Neo-liberal Governance: The Disempowering Work of 
Empowerment. International Planning Studies. 9(4): 239-259.   
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13563470500050130/ 
Morrisin-Saunders, Angus. Impact Assessment: Practical Solutions To Recurrent 
Problems And Contempora. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Munton, Don. 1996. Hazardous Waste Siting And Democratic Choice. Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press. 
 
Nearing, Brian. 2011. “Covanta, Seeking N.Y. Renewable Nod, Pays $400,000 Dioxin 
Fine at Conn. Trash-Burn Plant”. Times Union. 
http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Media%2011/CovantaPaysPenaltyInConnectic
utDioxinsCase_TimesUnion.pdf  
Nelson, Joyce. 2009. “Incinerators - Waste-to-Energy Proposals” Watershed Sentinel. 
http://watershedsentinel.ca/content/incinerators-waste-energy-proposals  
Nelson, Joyce. 2010. “Waste-to-Energy Incineration is Both Noxious and Expensive”. 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. 
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/waste-energy-incineration-both-
noxious-and-expensive 
Nelson, Joyce. 2010b. “Waste-To-Energy, Part 2 - Covanta” Watershed Sentinel. 
http://www.watershedsentinel.ca/content/waste-energy-part-2-covanta 
O’Faircheallaigh, C. “Public Participation and Environmental Impact Assessment: 
Purpose, Implications and Lessons for Public Policy Making,” Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review 30, 19-27 (2010) 
 
O’Meara, Jennifer. 2011. “Clarington Citizens Protest Incinerator”. Oshawa This Week. 
	   106	  
http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3509858-clarington-citizens-protest-
incinerator/ 
Petts, J. (1994). Effective Waste Management: Understanding and Dealing With Public 
Concerns. Waste Management &Amp; Research, 12(3), 207-222. http://dx. 
doi.org/10.1177/0734242x9401200303 
 
Pietroniro, Ron. 2009. “Covanta Energy Defends Record on Garbage Incineration” 
Oshawa This Week. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3467233-covanta-energy-
defends-record-on-garbage-incineration/ 
 
Prevent Cancer Now (PCN). 2010. “Queen’s Park Anti-Incineration Rally a Huge 
Success. Prevent Cancer Now. http://www.preventcancernow.ca/queens-park-anti-
incineration-rally-a-huge-success  
 
Psomopoulos, C.S., A. Bourka, and N.J. Themelis. 2009. "Waste-To-Energy: A Review 
Of The Status And Benefits In USA". Waste Management 29 (5): 1718-1724. 
doi:10.1016/j.wasman.2008.11.020.  
 
Rahder, Barbara and Milgrom, Richard. 2004.  The Uncertain City: Making space(s) 





Ramachandra, T.V. 2006. “Management Of Municipal Solid Waste”. New Delhi. TERI 
Press. 
 
Region of Durham Works Department Waste Management Services. 1999. “Region Of 
Durham Long Term Waste Management Strategy Plan: 2000 To 2020”. Whitby. The 
Regional Municipality of Durham. 
 
Region of Durham Works Department Waste Management Services. 2015. “Waste 
Management Annual Report 2014”. Whitby. The Regional Municipality of Durham. 
 
Regional Municipality of Durham. 2010. “Backgrounder: MOE Approves The 
Durham/York Residual Waste Study”. Whitby. The Regional Municipality of Durham. 
 
Regional Municipality of Durham. 2015. “Durham York Energy Centre Fires Up 
Operation”. Whitby. The Regional Municipality of Durham. 
https://www.durham.ca/news.asp?health=no&type=NR&nr=dnews/2015/Feb13151.htm  
 
Regional Municipalities of Durham and York, (2012). Durham York Energy 
Centre Community Communications Plan (pp. 3-21). Clarington: The Regional 
Municipalities of Durham and York.  
 
Stone, Jennifer. 2007. “Incinerator Could Be Safe, But Choose The Right Site: 
	   107	  


























Todd, S. “Building Consensus on Divisive Issues: A Case Study of the Yukon Wolf 
Management Team” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 22. 655-684 (2002). 
 
Vyhnak, Carola. 2011. “Angry Protesters Disrupt Durham Incinerator Groundbreaking”. 




Waste Management World (WMW). 2011. "Canada Stopped From Exporting 3 Million 
Tons Of Waste Into Michigan". Waste Management World. https://waste-management-
world.com/a/canada-stopped-from-exporting-3-million-tons-of-waste-into-michigan. 
 
Watson, Vanessa. 2002. The Usefulness of Normative Planning Theories in the Context 
of Sub  Saharan Africa. Planning Theory. 1:1: pp. 27-52. 
http://journals1.scholarsportal.info/tmp15022077650946978981.pdf  
 
Webber, Melvin. 1963.  Comprehensive planning and social responsibility: towards an 
AIP consensus on the profession’s roles and purposes.  Journal of the American Institute 
of Planners.  29(4): 232-241. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf10.1080/01944366308978072 
	   108	  
 











	   109	  
Appendix 
Fig	  1	  –	  Site	  Visit	  Photos:	  Fig	  1.1	  –	  DYEC	  Frontage	  and	  Emission	  Monitoring	  Billboard.	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.2	  –	  Tipping	  Floor	  and	  Feeder	  	  
	  	   	  
	   110	  
Fig	  1.3	  –	  Feeder	  Controller	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.4	  –	  Incinerator	  Control	  and	  Emission	  Monitoring	  Centre	  	  
	  	   	  
	   111	  
Fig	  1.5	  –	  Inside	  the	  DYEC	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.6	  –	  Martin	  Grate	  System	  Boiler	  	  
	  	  	  
	   112	  
Fig	  1.7	  –	  Incineration	  Viewing	  Window	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.8	  –	  Bottom	  Ash	  Expeller	  	  
	   	  
	   113	  
Fig	  1.9	  –	  Inlet	  Duct	  Sending	  Flue	  Gas	  to	  Emission	  Control	  System	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.10	  –	  Fly	  Ash	  Hoppers	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
	   114	  
Fig	  1.11	  –	  Emission	  Monitor	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.12	  –	  Pipes	  Sending	  Steam	  To	  Generators	  	  
	  	   	  
	   115	  
Fig	  1.13	  –	  Switch	  Yard	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.14	  –	  Bottom	  Ash	  	  
	  	   	  
	   116	  
Fig	  1.15	  –	  Processed	  Fly	  Ash	  	  
	  	  Fig	  1.16	  –	  Recovered	  Ferrous	  Metals	  	  
	  	  	  	   	  
	   117	  
Fig	  1.17	  –	  Recovered	  Non-­‐Ferrous	  Metals	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Fig	  2	  –	  Photos	  of	  Protests	  and	  PICs:	  	  	  Fig	  2.1	  –	  CAW	  Sponsored	  Energy-­‐From-­‐Waste	  Public	  Forum	  (May	  9	  2007)	  	  
 
May 9 2007 Energy-From-Waste Public Forum. Digital Image. Durham Environment Watch. 
Accessed November 2016. http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/photo_gallery.htm  Fig.	  2.2	  -­‐	  First	  Anti-­‐Incinerator	  Rally	  (July	  30	  2007)	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July 30 2007 - 1st Rally Against Incineration. Digital Image. Durham Environment Watch. Accessed 
November 2016. http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/July30_07Rally.htm 	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September 4, 2007 - 2nd Rally Against Incineration. Digital Image. Durham Environment Watch. 
Accessed November 2016. http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Sept4Rally.htm 
	   121	  
Fig.	  2.4	  –	  Public	  Information	  Session	  (October	  3,	  2007)	  
 
October 3, 2007 – Public Information Session. Digital Image. Durham Environment Watch. Accessed 
November 2016. http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Oct3_07PIC.htm  
 
 
Fig 2.5 – Public Information Session (October 9, 2007) 
 
October 9, 2007 – Public Information Session. Digital Image. Durham Environment Watch. Accessed 
November 2016. http://www.durhamenvironmentwatch.org/Oct9_07PICCourtice.htm   	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Fig. 2.6 – Queen’s Park Anti-Incineration Rally (May 13, 2010) 	  
	  
Queen’s Park Rally. Digital Image. Durham Clear. Accessed November 2016. 
http://durhamclear.ca/taxonomy/term/33 Fig	  2.7	  –	  Queen’s	  Park	  Anti-­‐Incineration	  Rally	  (May	  13,	  2010)	  	  
	  
Queen’s Park Rally. Digital Image. Prevent Cancer Now. Accessed November 2016. 
http://www.preventcancernow.ca/queens-park-anti-incineration-rally-a-huge-success 
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Fig	  2.8	  –	  Protest	  at	  Durham	  Waste	  Fair	  (March	  5,	  2011)	  	  
 
March 8, 2011 – Clarington Citizens Protest Incinerator. Digital Image. Oshawa This Week. 
Accessed November 2016. http://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/3509858-clarington-citizens-
protest-incinerator/ 	  Fig.	  2.9	  –	  Protest	  at	  Incinerator	  Groundbreaking	  (August	  17,	  2011)	  	  
 
August 17, 2011 – Angry Protesters Disrupt Durham Incinerator Groundbreaking. Digital Image. 
The Toronto Star. Accessed November 2016. 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2011/08/17/angry_protesters_disrupt_durham_incinerator_groun
dbreaking.html    
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August 17, 2011 – Durham Breaks Ground on Controversial Incinerator. Digital Image. The Toronto 
Star. Accessed November 2016. 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2011/08/17/angry_protesters_disrupt_durham_incinerator_groun
dbreaking.html     
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Fig	  3	  –	  Chronology	  of	  Key	  Events	  Related	  to	  the	  DYEC:	  
Date:	   Topic:	   Public	  Outreach	  
for	  PICs:	  
Number	  of	  PICs:	  Dec	  1999	   Region	  Released	  




	   	  
Nov	  2002	   Keele	  Valley	  Landfill	  
Closes	   	   	  
2003	   Durham	  begins	  
shipping	  waste	  to	  
Michigan	   	   	  
2004	   Durham	  began	  
"Durham	  Residual	  
Waste	  Study"	   	   	  
Oct	  -­‐	  Nov	  2004	   PIC	  -­‐	  Introduced	  the	  
Residual	  Waste	  
Study	  and	  Ontario's	  
EA	  Act	  
12	  Ads	  Placed	  in	  
Local	  Newspapers	   8	  
Feb	  -­‐	  May	  2005	   PIC	  -­‐	  Notify	  public	  of	  
alternatives	  
available	  to	  manage	  




potential	  sites,	  and	  
how	  the	  public	  
should	  be	  
consulted.	  (Used	  to	  
develop	  the	  EA	  
Terms	  of	  Reference)	  
25	  Ads	  Placed	  in	  
Local	  Newspapers	  
and	  Local	  College	  
Newspaper.	  
11	  
May	  2005	   York	  Region	  
partners	  with	  
Durham	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  
residual	  waste	  
study	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Date:	   Topic:	   Public	  Outreach	  
for	  PICs:	  
Number	  of	  PICs:	  
May	  -­‐	  Sept	  2005	   PIC	  -­‐	  Discuss	  and	  
obtain	  input	  on	  
alternatives	  to	  
manage	  waste	  and	  
the	  methodologies	  
and	  criteria	  for	  
evaluating	  the	  
alternatives	  during	  
the	  EA	  study.	  
38	  Ads	  Placed	  in	  
Local	  Newspapers	   11	  
Oct	  2005	   PIC	  -­‐	  Obtain	  
feedback	  from	  
residents	  about	  the	  
EA.	  
11	  Ads	  Placed	  in	  
local	  Newspapers	   6	  
March	  2006	   PIC	  -­‐	  Discuss	  
possible	  solutions	  to	  
the	  residual	  waste	  
question.	  
Unknown	   6	  
April	  2006	   Consultants	  began	  
30-­‐day	  consultation	  
period	  with	  public	  
to	  review	  their	  draft	  
report	  and	  submit	  
comments.	  
	   	  
May	  2006	   PIC	  -­‐	  Obtain	  
feedback	  from	  the	  
public	  about	  their	  
preferred	  
technology.	  Input	  





60	  ads	  ran	  from	  Feb	  





dailies,	  and	  buses	  in	  
Durham	  and	  York	  
Regions.	  
6	  





build	  a	  thermal	  
treatment	  facility.	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Date:	   Topic:	   Public	  Outreach	  
for	  PICs:	   Number	  of	  PICs:	  
Sept	  2006	   PIC	  -­‐	  Obtain	  
feedback	  on	  which	  
criteria	  should	  be	  a	  
top	  priority	  when	  
siting	  a	  thermal	  
treatment	  facility.	  
77	  ads	  ran	  from	  Aug	  





dailies,	  and	  buses	  in	  
Durham	  and	  York	  
Regions.	  
6	  
March	  2007	   Consultants	  brought	  
forth	  short	  list	  of	  5	  
potential	  sites	  for	  
incinerator.	  
	   	  
April	  2007	   PIC	  -­‐	  Obtain	  
feedback	  on	  the	  
short	  list	  of	  
potential	  sites.	  
10	  ads	  ran	  from	  





June	  2007	   PIC	  -­‐	  Give	  
information	  on	  and	  
receive	  feedback	  on	  






7	  ads	  were	  placed	  in	  
local	  newspapers,	  
and	  ongoing	  ads	  ran	  
on	  local	  radio.	  
6	  
July	  2007	   First	  Anti-­‐
Incineration	  Rally	  
outside of the 
Clarington 
municipal building	  
	   	  
Sept	  2007	   Anti-­‐Incineration	  
Rally	  in front of 
Durham Regional 
headquarters	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Date:	   Topic:	   Public	  Outreach	  
for	  PICs:	   Number	  of	  PICs:	  
Oct	  2007	   PIC	  -­‐	  Notify	  the	  




Discuss	  the	  results	  
and	  the	  evaluation	  
process.	  
12	  ads	  were	  placed	  
in	  local	  newspapers	  
and	  radio.	   3	  




preferred	  site	  for	  
incinerator,	  
Clarington,	  Ontario.	  
	   	  
Jan	  2008	   CAW	  hosts	  
incineration	  public	  
forum	   	   	  
Jan	  2008	   Clarington	  declares	  
itself	  an	  unwilling	  
host	  for	  incinerator	   	   	  
Jan	  2008	   Oshawa	  city	  council	  
passes	  motion	  to	  
reject	  incinerator	   	   	  
Feb	  2008	   Anti-­‐Incineration	  




	   	  
Mar	  2008	   Pickering	  City	  
Council	  passes	  




	   	  
April	  2008	   Proposed	  emissions	  
limits	  for	  incinerator	  
released	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Date:	   Topic:	   Public	  Outreach	  
for	  PICs:	   Number	  of	  PICs:	  
Aug	  2008	   Regions	  put	  out	  RFP	  
for	  the	  design,	  
construction,	  and	  
maintenance	  of	  the	  
energy-­‐from-­‐waste	  
incinerator.	  
	   	  




	   	  
April	  2009	   Covanta	  Energy's	  
chosen	  to	  be	  build/	  
operator	  of	  the	  
DYEC.	  
	   	  
May	  2009	   Clarington	  rescinds	  
unwilling	  host	  
status.	  
	   	  
May	  2009	   Anti-­‐Incineration	  
Protest	  outside	  a	  
Clarington	  
municipal	  building	  
and	  a	  second	  
protest	  held	  outside	  
Durham	  Regional	  
headquarters.	  
	   	  
May	  2009	   PIC	  -­‐	  Notify	  
residents	  about	  the	  
results	  of	  the	  
further	  site	  specific	  
studies	  completed	  
for	  the	  EA.	  
Ads	  were	  placed	  in	  
local	  newspapers	   2	  
June	  2009	   Regional	  council	  
approved	  the	  EA	   	   	  
July	  2009	   EA	  submitted	  to	  the	  
MOECC	   	   	  
May	  2010	   Queen's	  Park	  Anti-­‐
Incineration	  Rally	  
	   	  
May	  2010	   Queen's	  Park	  Anti-­‐
Incineration	  Rally	  
	   	  
Nov	  2010	   The	  MOECC	  
approved	  the	  EA	  
	   	  
	   130	  
	  
Date:	   Topic:	   Public	  Outreach	  
for	  PICs:	   Number	  of	  PICs:	  
Dec	  2010	   Waste	  shipments	  to	  
Michigan	  End	   	   	  
March	  2011	   Protest	  at	  Durham	  
Waste	  Fair	   	   	  
July	  2011	   DurhamCLEAR	  files	  
lawsuit	  over	  
incinerator	   	   	  
Aug	  2011	   Construction	  of	  the	  
DYEC	  began	   	   	  
Aug	  2011	   Protest	  at	  
groundbreaking	   	   	  
Dec	  2011	   Durham	  Council	  
passes	  motion	  to	  
reduce	  time	  and	  
quantity	  delegates	  
are	  allowed	  to	  
speak	  at	  council.	  
	   	  
Aug	  2012	   DurhamCLEAR	  
drops	  lawsuit	  due	  to	  
insufficient	  funds.	   	   	  
Feb	  2015	   DYEC	  Began	  
Operations	  
	   	  
Dec	  2015	   DYEC	  fails	  emission	  
testing.	  
	   	  
Jan	  2016	   Covanta's	  contract	  
amended	  to	  allow	  
them	  to	  produce	  
more	  ash.	  
	   	  
June	  2016	   Ontario	  passes	  the	  
'Waste-­‐Free	  Ontario	  
Act	  
	   	  
July	  2016	   One	  of	  the	  DYEC's	  
boilers	  had	  to	  be	  
shut	  down	  after	  
failing	  emission	  
tests.	  
	   	  
	  	  
 
 
